ISA-IEC-62443 ISA/IEC 62443 Cybersecurity Fundamentals Specialist Free Practice Exam Questions (2026 Updated)

ISA/IEC 62443 recognizes that organizations may align their IACS cybersecurity programs with other authoritative guidance. Within the NIST Special Publications, SP 800-82 is the document specifically dedicated to Industrial Control Systems security.

Step 1: Scope of SP 800-82

SP 800-82 provides guidance tailored to ICS environments, including SCADA, DCS, and PLC-based systems. It addresses availability, safety, and real-time constraints similar to ISA/IEC 62443.

Step 2: Complementary relationship

ISA/IEC 62443 and SP 800-82 are often used together: ISA/IEC 62443 provides auditable requirements, while SP 800-82 provides practical implementation guidance.

Step 3: Why other options are incorrect

SP 800-30 focuses on risk assessment

SP 800-53 defines general security controls

SP 800-171 focuses on protecting CUI in non-federal systems

Therefore, the correct answer is SP 800-82.

SP Element 2 in ISA/IEC 62443-2-1 focuses on Configuration Management, with the asset inventory baseline as a foundational requirement.

Step 1: Purpose of an inventory baseline

The inventory baseline documents all hardware, software, firmware, and configuration items that make up the IACS. This establishes a known, trusted state of the system.

Step 2: Architecture visibility

By maintaining this baseline, the asset owner gains a clear and accurate understanding of the IACS architecture, including system components, versions, and dependencies.

Step 3: Why other options are incorrect

Physical access control and user authentication are addressed in different SP Elements. Event management detects anomalies, but it relies on the inventory baseline rather than replacing it.

Thus, the primary reason is to document IACS architecture.

One of the primary goals of providing a framework that addresses secure product development lifecycle requirements is to ensure that security policies and procedures are well-documented. This objective is crucial because it establishes a structured and standardized approach to security that is integrated throughout the development process of software or systems. This framework helps in aligning the development process with security best practices, thereby mitigating risks associated with security vulnerabilities. Documentation of security policies and procedures ensures that security considerations are consistently applied and that compliance with relevant standards, such as ISA/IEC 62443, is maintained. This foundational approach supports the overall security posture by embedding security considerations directly into the lifecycle of product development, rather than addressing security as an afterthought.

The ISA/IEC 62443-4-1 standard defines the requirements for a secure product development lifecycle for IACS products. One of the core requirements is “risk management” — the systematic process of identifying, evaluating, and mitigating security risks throughout the product lifecycle. This ensures that security is built in from the early design phases through to maintenance and decommissioning. While agile and continuous integration can be useful development methods, they are not specific requirements of the standard. Defense-in-depth is a security principle, not a lifecycle process requirement.

ISA/IEC 62443 requires that vulnerability management go beyond detection and focus on understanding why vulnerabilities exist. Identification analysis is a critical step in this process.

Step 1: Purpose of identification analysis

The standard requires asset owners and suppliers to analyze discovered vulnerabilities to determine their origin and contributing factors. This ensures corrective actions address systemic issues, not just symptoms.

Step 2: Root cause focus

Root cause analysis identifies whether vulnerabilities result from configuration errors, insecure design, missing controls, or process failures. This aligns with the standard’s emphasis on prevention and continuous improvement.

Step 3: Why other options are incorrect

User interface improvements and marketing strategies are unrelated to cybersecurity risk reduction. Cost considerations may follow remediation planning but are not the purpose of identification analysis.

Step 4: Lifecycle relevance

By identifying root causes, organizations can prevent recurrence and strengthen controls across the IACS lifecycle.

Thus, the correct answer is Root cause analysis.

The Triton (also known as Trisis) malware specifically targeted and compromised Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS), disabling the emergency shutdown capabilities at a petrochemical plant. This attack demonstrated that safety systems, once considered isolated and secure, are vulnerable to sophisticated, targeted cyberattacks. Neither Zeus, Stuxnet, nor WannaCry had this specific impact on emergency shutdown safety systems.

API 1164 is an industry sector-specific standard that provides guidance on the cybersecurity of pipeline supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. API stands for American Petroleum Institute, which is the largest U.S. trade association for the oil and natural gas industry. API 1164 was first published in 2004 and revised in 2009 and 2021. The latest version of the standard aligns with the ISA/IEC 62443 series of standards and incorporates the concepts of security levels, zones, and conduits. API 1164 covers the security lifecycle of pipeline SCADA systems, from risk assessment and policy development to implementation and maintenance. The standard also defines roles and responsibilities, security requirements, security controls, and security assessment methods for pipeline SCADA systems.

ISA/IEC 62443-3-2 focuses on the cybersecurity risk assessment process, including:

Identifying zones and conduits

Determining the Target Security Levels (SL-T)

Designing the IACS architecture based on risk-based zoning

“Part 3-2 defines a process for conducting cybersecurity risk assessments and designing system architectures that incorporate zones and conduits based on those risks.”

— ISA/IEC 62443-3-2:2020, Clause 5 – Risk Assessment Process

This part bridges the gap between risk evaluation and technical implementation.

According to the ISA/IEC 62443 standard, the connections between security zones are called conduits. A conduit is defined as a logical or physical grouping of communication channels connecting two or more zones that share common security requirements. A conduit can be used to control and monitor the data flow between zones, and to apply security measures such as encryption, authentication, filtering, or logging. A conduit can also be used to isolate zones from each other in case of a security breach or incident. A conduit can be implemented using various technologies, such as firewalls, routers, switches, cables, or wireless links. However, these technologies are not synonymous with conduits, as they are only components of a conduit. A firewall, for example, can be used to create multiple conduits between different zones, or to protect a single zone from external threats. Therefore, the other options (firewalls, tunnels, and pathways) are not correct names for the connections between security zones. References:

ISA/IEC 62443-3-2:2016 - Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 3-2: Security risk assessment and system design1

ISA/IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 3-3: System security requirements and security levels2

Zones and Conduits | Tofino Industrial Security Solution3

Key Concepts of ISA/IEC 62443: Zones & Security Levels | Dragos4

Within the context of the Cyber Security Management System (CSMS) as defined in ISA/IEC 62443-2-1, the primary stakeholders include operations staff (responsible for system operations), IT security staff (for information technology and cybersecurity controls), and physical security staff (for site access and physical barriers). Marketing staff are not typically listed as stakeholders in the design, implementation, or maintenance of the CSMS, since their role does not directly influence the security posture of industrial control systems. This is outlined in the roles and responsibilities sections of the standard.

ISA/IEC TR 62443-1-5 defines the rules for creating cybersecurity profiles. The key principle is preservation of standard integrity.

Step 1: Purpose of profiles

Profiles allow selection and scoping of existing requirements for specific industries or applications.

Step 2: Restriction on modification

The technical report explicitly states that no new security requirements may be added, and existing requirements must not be altered. This ensures interoperability, auditability, and certification consistency.

Step 3: Correct approach

Profiles may select, exclude, or contextualize requirements, but they cannot redefine them.

Therefore, Option C is correct.

The ISA/IEC 62443-3-2 standard specifies that a key output of the risk assessment process is the establishment of Target Security Levels (SL-Ts) for each security zone or conduit. These target levels define the minimum cybersecurity requirements necessary to mitigate identified risks to an acceptable level. Total risk elimination is generally not possible; instead, setting SL-Ts allows for structured, risk-based implementation of security controls.

SP Element 3 in ISA/IEC 62443-2-1 focuses on Network and Communication Security, with segmentation as a foundational control.

Step 1: Threat origin reality

Many cyberattacks targeting IACS originate from enterprise IT networks, remote access paths, or external connections. Without segmentation, these threats can propagate directly into control systems.

Step 2: Zones and conduits concept

ISA/IEC 62443 requires logical and physical separation between IACS zones and non-IACS zones, with controlled conduits enforcing security policies.

Step 3: Attack surface reduction

Segmentation limits exposure by ensuring that only explicitly authorized communications can cross zone boundaries.

Step 4: Why other options are incorrect

Data classification, identity persistence, and backup verification are handled by other SP Elements and foundational requirements.

Thus, segmentation is critical to prevent attacks originating outside the IACS, making Option B correct.

The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) is an application layer protocol that moves files between local and remote file systems. It runs on top of TCP, like HTTP. To transfer a file, 2 TCP connections are used by FTP in parallel: control connection and data connection. The control connection is used to send commands and responses between the client and the server, while the data connection is used to transfer the actual file. FTP is one of the standard communication protocols defined by the TCP/IP model and it does not fit neatly into the OSI model. However, since the OSI model is a reference model that describes the general functions of each layer, FTP can be considered as an application layer protocol in the OSI model, as it provides user services and interfaces to the network. The application layer is the highest layer in the OSI model and it is responsible for providing various network services to the users, such as email, web browsing, file transfer, remote login, etc. The application layer interacts with the presentation layer, which is responsible for data formatting, encryption, compression, etc. The presentation layer interacts with the session layer, which is responsible for establishing, maintaining, and terminating sessions between applications. The session layer interacts with the transport layer, which is responsible for reliable end-to-end data transfer and flow control. The transport layer interacts with the network layer, which is responsible for routing and addressing packets across different networks. The network layer interacts with the data link layer, which is responsible for framing, error detection, and medium access control. The data link layer interacts with the physical layer, which is responsible for transmitting and receiving bits over the physical medium. References:

File Transfer Protocol (FTP) in Application Layer1

FTP Protocol2

What OSI layer is FTP?3

Patches are software updates that fix bugs, vulnerabilities, or improve performance or functionality. Patches are important for maintaining the security and reliability of an IACS environment, but they also pose some challenges and risks. Applying patches in an IACS environment is not as simple as in an IT environment, because patches may affect the availability, integrity, or safety of the IACS. Therefore, patches should not be applied blindly or automatically, but based on the organization’s risk assessment. The risk assessment should consider the following factors: 1

The severity and likelihood of the vulnerability that the patch addresses

The impact of the patch on the IACS functionality and performance

The compatibility of the patch with the IACS components and configuration

The availability of a backup or recovery plan in case the patch fails or causes problems

The testing and validation of the patch before applying it to the production system

The communication and coordination with the stakeholders involved in the patching process

The documentation and auditing of the patching activities and results References: ISA TR62443-2-3 - Security for industrial automation and control systems, Part 2-3: Patch management in the IACS environment

Application whitelisting (AWL) is a technique that allows only authorized applications to run on a system, and blocks any unauthorized or malicious code from executing. AWL is one of the most effective methods for preventing malware infections and reducing the attack surface of a system. AWL can be implemented at different levels, such as the operating system, the network, or the application itself. AWL is especially useful for industrial automation and control systems (IACS), which often run on legacy or proprietary platforms that are not compatible with traditional antivirus software or other security solutions. AWL can also help protect IACS from zero-day attacks, which exploit unknown vulnerabilities that have not been patched or detected by security vendors. AWL is recommended by the ISA/IEC 62443 standards as a key component of malicious code protection for IACS. According to the standards, AWL should be applied to all IACS components that support it, and should be configured and maintained according to the security policies and procedures of the organization. AWL should also be complemented by other security measures, such as network segmentation, zones and conduits, and patch management, to provide a defense-in-depth approach to IACS security. References:

ISA/IEC 62443-3-3:2013, System security requirements and security levels, Section 5.2.3.41

ISA/IEC 62443-2-1:2010, Establishing an industrial automation and control systems security program, Section 4.3.3.6.42

ISA/IEC 62443-4-2:2019, Technical security requirements for IACS components, Section 4.2.3.43

ISA/IEC 62443-3-2:2020, Security risk assessment for system design, Section 7.3.3.44

ISA/IEC 62443-4-1:2018, Product development requirements, Section 5.2.3.45

Increasing cybercrime attacks have a significant impact on suppliers of essential services, including those in energy, water, transportation, and manufacturing. ISA/IEC 62443 and related critical infrastructure guidance highlight that attackers are increasingly targeting organizations whose disruption can have widespread societal consequences. While cybercrime can drive organizations to improve cybersecurity, the main documented impact is the risk to essential services and infrastructure.

The second edition (2024) of ISA/IEC 62443-2-1 introduced a significant structural improvement by eliminating duplication of Information Security Management System (ISMS) requirements. The first edition (2010) contained content that overlapped substantially with ISO/IEC 27001-style ISMS controls, leading to redundancy and unnecessary implementation burden.

In the updated edition, ISA clarified that 62443-2-1 is not intended to replace a general-purpose ISMS, but rather to extend and specialize it for Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS). As a result, duplicated ISMS clauses were removed or streamlined, and the focus shifted to IACS-specific risks, operational realities, and lifecycle concerns.

This change improves:

Compatibility with existing enterprise ISMS implementations

Clarity of roles between IT security governance and OT security management

Practical adoption by asset owners operating both IT and OT environments

Importantly, supply chain security, lifecycle management, and organizational governance were not removed. Instead, they were better aligned and referenced to avoid redundancy. The PDCA model remains implicit but was not newly introduced in 2024.

Thus, the defining change is the elimination of duplicated ISMS requirements, making Option B correct.

ISA/IEC 62443 references OPC technologies as common industrial communication mechanisms that must be secured appropriately. OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA) was designed specifically to overcome the limitations of OPC Classic while improving interoperability and security.

Step 1: Need for structured data modeling

Modern IACS environments require standardized, vendor-neutral data exchange across heterogeneous devices. OPC UA introduces a browsable namespace that organizes data into objects, folders, variables, methods, and relationships.

Step 2: Alignment with security and architecture goals

The browsable namespace enables consistent access control, integrity protection, and secure session management, aligning with ISA/IEC 62443 principles of controlled data flow and least privilege.

Step 3: Why other options are incorrect

OPC tunneling addresses connectivity, not data modeling.

DCOM-based firewalls relate to legacy OPC Classic.

OLE/COM technologies lack platform independence and modern security features.

Thus, OPC UA’s browsable namespace is the correct feature.