DVA-C02 Amazon Web Services AWS Certified Developer - Associate Free Practice Exam Questions (2026 Updated)

S3Bucket and S3Key: These properties in a CloudFormation AWS::Lambda::Function resource specify the location of the function's code in S3.

Least Development Effort: This solution minimizes code changes, relying on CloudFormation to reference the existing S3 deployment package.

This benefit occurs when initializing the AWS SDK outside of the Lambda handler function because it allows the SDK instance to be reused across multiple invocations of the same function. This can improve performance and reduce latency by avoiding unnecessary initialization overhead. If the SDK is initialized inside the handler function, it will create a new SDK instance for each invocation, which can increase memory usage and execution time.

The type of keys that the developer should use to meet the requirements is symmetric customer managed keys with key material that is generated by AWS. This way, the developer can use AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) to encrypt the data with a symmetric key that is managed by the developer. The developer can also enable automatic annual rotation for the key, which creates new key material for the key every year. The other options either involve using Amazon S3 managed keys, which do not support automatic annual rotation, or using asymmetric keys or imported key material, which are not supported by S3 encryption.

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cognito/latest/developerguide/amazon-cognito-integrating-user-pools-with-identity-pools.html

A function alias is a pointer to a specific Lambda function version. You can use aliases to create different environments for your function, such as development, testing, and production. You can also use aliases to perform blue/green deployments by shifting traffic between two versions of your function gradually. This way, you can easily roll back to a previous version if something goes wrong, without having to redeploy your code or change your configuration. Reference: AWS Lambda function aliases

Sensitive environment variables in Lambda should be protected using encryption helpers integrated with AWS KMS. Lambda environment variables are encrypted at rest, and when using a customer managed KMS key, teams can control the key policy, access, and rotation for their own microservices—matching the policy requirement that each team has “full control” over key rotation. AWS managed keys do not provide the same level of customer control over lifecycle and rotation decisions.

Therefore, the correct approach is to create customer managed KMS keys (one per team/service boundary or per microservice, depending on governance) and configure each Lambda function to use the relevant CMK for encrypting its environment variables. The Lambda execution role must have permission to use the key for decryption at runtime, typically requiring kms:Decrypt (and sometimes kms:DescribeKey depending on tooling). This is captured by Option B.

Option A and D use AWS managed keys, which do not satisfy the requirement for each team to control rotation. Rotation control (and policy ownership) is a key differentiator of customer managed keys.

Option C is not correct because the Lambda execution role does not need kms:CreateGrant and kms:Encrypt for decrypting environment variables at runtime. Over-permissioning increases risk. The Lambda service handles encryption of environment variables; the function runtime principally needs the ability to decrypt.

Amazon CloudWatch is the service that collects and stores logs from AWS Lambda functions. The developer can use CloudWatch Logs Insights to query and analyze the logs for errors and metrics. Option A is not correct because Amazon S3 is a storage service that does not store Lambda function logs. Option B is not correct because AWS CloudTrail is a service that records API calls and events for AWS services, not Lambda function logs. Option D is not correct because Amazon DynamoDB is a database service that does not store Lambda function logs.

The combination of steps that the developer should take to fix the errors is to deploy AWS X-Ray as a sidecar container to the microservices and instrument the ECS task to send the stdout and stderr output to Amazon CloudWatch Logs. This way, the developer can use AWS X-Ray to analyze and debug the performance of the microservices and identify any issues or bottlenecks. The developer can also use CloudWatch Logs to monitor and troubleshoot the logs from the ECS task and detect any errors or exceptions. The other options either involve using AWS X-Ray as a daemon set, which is not supported by Fargate, or using the PutTraceSegments API call, which is not necessary when using a sidecar container.

Step-by-Step Breakdown:

Requirement Summary:

Get notified when EC2 CPU Utilization > 80%

Option A: CloudWatch Alarm with SNS

Correct and standard AWS practice

CloudWatch automatically collects EC2 metrics, including CPUUtilization.

You can set a CloudWatch Alarm with a threshold (80% in this case).

Then, trigger an SNS notification to email, SMS, Lambda, etc.

Option B: AWS CloudTrail alarm

Incorrect: CloudTrail logs API activity, not performance metrics.

It doesn’t track metrics like CPU utilization.

Option C: Cron job on EC2 running --describe-instance-information

Incorrect: This doesn’t give CPU usage.

Also inefficient, and polling is bad practice when CloudWatch already monitors this natively.

Option D: Lambda function querying CloudTrail for CPU usage

Incorrect and conceptually flawed.

CloudTrail does not store performance metrics; CloudWatch does.

CloudWatch Alarms for EC2: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudWatch/latest/monitoring/AlarmThatSendsEmail.html

EC2 Metrics in CloudWatch: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/viewing_metrics_with_cloudwatch.html

Amazon SNS Notification Setup: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/sns-email-notifications.html

This solution meets the requirements because it encrypts data at rest using AWS KMS keys and provides an audit trail of when and by whom they were used. Server-side encryption with AWS KMS managed keys (SSE-KMS) is a feature of Amazon S3 that encrypts data using keys that are managed by AWS KMS. When SSE-KMS is enabled for an S3 bucket or object, S3 requests AWS KMS to generate data keys and encrypts data using these keys. AWS KMS logs every use of its keys in AWS CloudTrail, which records all API calls to AWS KMS as events. These events include information such as who made the request, when it was made, and which key was used. The company policy can use CloudTrail logs to audit critical events related to their data encryption and access. Server-side encryption with Amazon S3 managed keys (SSE-S3) also encrypts data at rest using keys that are managed by S3, but does not provide an audit trail of key usage. Server-side encryption with customer-provided keys (SSE-C) and server-side encryption with self-managed keys also encrypt data at rest using keys that are provided or managed by customers, but do not provide an audit trail of key usage and require additional overhead for key management.

Lambda Concurrency: The 'maximum concurrency' setting in event source mappings controls the maximum number of simultaneous invocations Lambda allows for that specific source.

Prioritizing Queues: Setting a lower maximum concurrency for the 'high priority queue' ensures it's processed first while allowing more concurrent invocations from the 'low priority queue'.

Batching: Batch size settings affect the number of messages Lambda retrieves from a queue per invocation, which is less relevant to the prioritization requirement.

The most secure and AWS-recommended way for a Lambda function to access other AWS services is to use an IAM execution role. Lambda assumes this role at runtime and receives temporary credentials that are automatically rotated by AWS. The developer attaches the necessary permissions (the existing IAM policy) to that role, and then configures the Lambda function to use the role.

Option B follows least privilege and avoids long-term credentials. It also integrates with AWS security tooling: IAM Access Analyzer, CloudTrail, and policy boundaries can all be applied cleanly. Because the policy already exists, this requires minimal extra work: create/choose the execution role, attach the policy, and assign the role to the function.

Option A is not correct because IAM policies are attached to IAM identities (users, groups, roles) — not directly to Lambda functions as standalone entities. Lambda permissions are granted through the function’s execution role.

Option C is insecure because it uses long-term IAM user access keys embedded in environment variables. Even if encrypted, this expands the blast radius, complicates rotation, and contradicts AWS best practices for avoiding static credentials inside code/runtime.

Option D is extremely insecure and noncompliant. Root user access keys should not be used for applications and should generally not exist.

Therefore, create and attach the existing policy to a Lambda execution IAM role and assign that role to the function.

The immutable deployment method is the best option for this scenario, because it meets the requirements of maintaining full capacity, avoiding service interruption, and minimizing the cost of additional resources.

The immutable deployment method creates a new set of instances in a separate Auto Scaling group and deploys the new version of the application to them. Then, it swaps the new instances with the old ones and terminates the old instances. This way, the application maintains full capacity during the deployment and avoids any downtime. The cost of additional resources is also minimized, because the new instances are only created for a short time and then replaced by the old ones.

The other deployment methods do not meet all the requirements:

The all at once method deploys the new version to all instances simultaneously, which causes a short period of downtime and reduced capacity.

The rolling with additional batch method deploys the new version in batches, but for the first batch it creates new instances instead of using the existing ones. This increases the cost of additional resources and reduces the capacity of the original environment.

The blue/green method creates a new environment with a new set of instances and deploys the new version to them. Then, it swaps the URLs between the old and new environments. This method maintains full capacity and avoids service interruption, but it also increases the cost of additional resources significantly, because it duplicates the entire environment.

To monitor end-to-end requests and debug issues across microservices, you need distributed tracing. Among AWS tools, AWS X-Ray is specifically built for this use case.

Step-by-Step Breakdown:

Step 1: Understand the Requirement

The developer needs:

End-to-end request tracing across microservices

Debugging capability for performance issues or failures

This points directly to a distributed tracing solution rather than just logs or metrics.

Step 2: Evaluate the Options

Option A: Amazon CloudWatch

CloudWatch is powerful for metrics, logs, and alerts.

But it does not provide distributed tracing or request path visualization between microservices.

So, it's not sufficient alone for the requirement.

Option B: AWS CloudTrail

CloudTrail tracks API calls made through the AWS Management Console, CLI, SDKs.

It is meant for auditing and governance, not microservices request tracing.

Not suitable for debugging microservices interactions.

Option C: AWS X-Ray SDK with X-Ray service map

Purpose-built for distributed tracing

Automatically collects data about requests as they travel through your microservices

You can instrument your code with the AWS X-Ray SDK in Java, Node.js, Python, Go, .NET, etc.

Visualizes requests using a service map, showing latency, errors, and time spent in downstream services.

How it works:

Instrument each microservice using the AWS X-Ray SDK.

Use the SDK to trace requests, propagate trace headers across services.

The X-Ray daemon collects and sends trace data to the X-Ray service.

You can view the service map, see bottlenecks, error rates, etc.

Option D: AWS Health

AWS Health provides information on AWS service outages or account-level events.

It does not monitor your application or microservices health or request flows.

Correct Choice: C is the only option that meets the developer's requirement to monitor end-to-end request paths and debug issues in a microservices architecture.

AWS Developer References:

AWS X-Ray Documentation: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/xray/latest/devguide/aws-xray.html

Instrumenting your application: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/xray/latest/devguide/xray-sdk.html

Viewing the Service Map: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/xray/latest/devguide/xray-console-service-map.html

Tracing Microservices with AWS X-Ray: https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/tracing-microservices-aws-x-ray/

Step-by-Step Breakdown:

Requirement Summary:

In-transit encryption (when data is moving between client and S3)

Encryption at rest using AWS KMS keys (which are rotatable on-demand)

Option A: Write an S3 bucket policy to allow only encrypted connections over HTTPS by using permissions boundary

Incorrect: Permissions boundaries are for IAM policy control, not S3 bucket policies.

Also, encryption enforcement in-transit is not achieved through permissions boundaries.

Option B: Configure an S3 bucket policy to enable client-side encryption

Incorrect: AWS does not enforce client-side encryption via S3 bucket policies.

Client-side encryption must be handled entirely by the application.

Also, KMS is for server-side encryption, not client-side.

Option C: Configure the application to encrypt the objects by using an AWS KMS customer managed key before uploading the objects

Correct: This fulfills the requirement of encrypting objects at rest using a KMS CMK, which can be rotated.

You can specify the KMS key using the SSE-KMS option when putting an object.

Option D: Write an S3 bucket policy to allow only encrypted connections over HTTPS by using the aws:SecureTransport condition

Correct: This enforces in-transit encryption, which ensures that only HTTPS connections are allowed.

This is the AWS-recommended way to enforce encryption in transit via bucket policy.

Option E: Configure S3 Block Public Access settings for the S3 bucket to allow only encrypted connections over HTTPS

Incorrect: Block Public Access is used to prevent public exposure of the bucket.

It has nothing to do with encryption enforcement, whether in transit or at rest.

Using SSE-KMS: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/UsingKMSEncryption.html

aws:SecureTransport condition in bucket policies: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/amazon-s3-policy-keys.html

Server-side encryption with AWS KMS: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/serv-side-encryption.html

This solution allows the fastest response for the query because it enables the query to use a single partition key value (the Product ID) and a range of sort key values (the Product Rating) to find the matching items. A global secondary index (GSI) is an index that has a partition key and an optional sort key that are different from those on the base table. A GSI can be created at any time and can be queried or scanned independently of the base table. A local secondary index (LSI) is an index that has the same partition key as the base table, but a different sort key. An LSI can only be created when the base table is created and must be queried together with the base table partition key. Using a GSI with Product ID as the partition key and Review ID as the sort key will not allow the query to use a range of sort key values to find the highest ratings. Using an LSI with Product ID as the partition key and Product Rating as the sort key will not work because Product ID is not the partition key of the base table. Using an LSI with Review ID as the partition key and Product ID as the sort key will not allow the query to use a single partition key value to find the matching items.

These solutions will mitigate the error most cost-effectively because they do not require increasing the provisioned throughput of the DynamoDB table or creating additional resources. Exponential backoff is a retry strategy that increases the waiting time between retries to reduce the number of requests sent to DynamoDB. The AWS SDKs for DynamoDB implement exponential backoff by default and also provide other features such as automatic pagination and encryption. Increasing the read and write throughput of the DynamoDB table, creating a DynamoDB Accelerator (DAX) cluster, or creating a second DynamoDB table will incur additional costs and complexity.