DVA-C02 Amazon Web Services AWS Certified Developer - Associate Free Practice Exam Questions (2026 Updated)

This solution will meet the requirements by ensuring that all traffic between users and CloudFront, and all traffic between CloudFront and the web application, are encrypted using HTTPS protocol. The Origin Protocol Policy determines how CloudFront communicates with the origin server (the web application), and setting it to “HTTPS Only” will force CloudFront to use HTTPS for every request to the origin server. The Viewer Protocol Policy determines how CloudFront responds to HTTP or HTTPS requests from users, and setting it to “HTTPS Only” or “Redirect HTTP to HTTPS” will force CloudFront to use HTTPS for every response to users. Option A is not optimal because it will use AWS KMS to encrypt traffic between CloudFront and the web application, which is not necessary or supported by CloudFront. Option C is not optimal because it will set the origin’s HTTP port to 443, which is incorrect as port 443 is used for HTTPS protocol, not HTTP protocol. Option E is not optimal because it will enable the CloudFront option Restrict Viewer Access, which is used for controlling access to private content using signed URLs or signed cookies, not for encrypting traffic.

To reduce the time it takes for new Auto Scaling instances to become ready, the most effective optimization is to bake the time-consuming installation and configuration steps into a custom AMI . By creating a prebuilt AMI that already contains the application binaries, dependencies, and baseline configuration, new instances start from an image that is already near “ready to serve.” This minimizes lengthy bootstrapping and significantly shortens the time required to pass ALB health checks and enter service. Therefore, creating a prebuilt AMI (B) is a primary performance optimization for faster scaling events and lower deployment variability.

After creating the AMI, the Auto Scaling group must actually use it. Because the infrastructure is managed with AWS CloudFormation , the developer should update the launch template resource (or launch configuration equivalent) in the CloudFormation template to reference the new AMI ID. This ensures that all newly launched instances use the optimized image consistently and that the change is tracked and repeatable as part of infrastructure as code. That is option C .

The other options are less optimal for the stated goal. Installing and configuring the app at launch time via Systems Manager Run Command (D) or CloudFormation helper scripts (E) still performs the expensive work during instance initialization, which prolongs launch time and can create variance (for example, dependency download time, repo availability, or transient network slowness). Option A (Marketplace AMI) could help only if a suitable prebuilt image exists for the exact custom application—which is unlikely for a proprietary application—and it also reduces control over the build and hardening process compared to maintaining an internal golden AMI.

Therefore, the best combination is B (bake the app into a custom AMI) and C (update the CloudFormation-managed launch template to use that AMI).

Why Option A is Correct:DynamoDB supports incremental exports to Amazon S3 natively, making data analytics-ready with minimal operational overhead.

Why Other Options are Incorrect:

Option B: DynamoDB Streams require additional processing logic to write to S3, increasing complexity.

Option C & D: Using EMR for data movement adds unnecessary operational overhead compared to native exports.

AWS Documentation References:

DynamoDB Exports to S3

IAM Roles for EC2: IAM roles are the recommended way to provide AWS credentials to applications running on EC2 instances. Here ' s how this works:

You create an IAM role with the necessary permissions to access the target S3 bucket.

You create an instance profile and associate the IAM role with this profile.

When launching the EC2 instance, you attach this instance profile.

Temporary Security Credentials: When the application on the EC2 instance needs to access S3, it doesn ' t directly use access keys. Instead, the AWS SDK running on the instance retrieves temporary security credentials associated with the role. These are rotated automatically by AWS.

This solution is the most efficient method to grant users access to AWS resources without requiring them to log in. Amazon Cognito is a service that provides user sign-up, sign-in, and access control for web and mobile applications. Amazon Cognito identity pools support both authenticated and unauthenticated users. Unauthenticated users receive access to your AWS resources even if they aren’t logged in with any of your identity providers (IdPs). You can use Amazon Cognito to associate unauthenticated users with an IAM role that has limited access to resources, such as Amazon S3 buckets or DynamoDB tables. This degree of access is useful to display content to users before they log in or to allow them to perform certain actions without signing up. Using an identity provider to securely authenticate with the application will require users to log in, which does not meet the requirement. Creating an AWS Lambda function to create an IAM user when a user accesses the application will incur unnecessary costs and complexity, and may pose security risks if not implemented properly. Creating credentials using AWS KMS and applying them to users when using the application will also incur unnecessary costs and complexity, and may not provide fine-grained access control for resources.

By default, an Auto Scaling group uses EC2 status checks to determine instance health. EC2 status checks confirm that an instance is running and reachable at the infrastructure level, but they do not validate that the application is healthy behind the load balancer. In this scenario, the ALB is returning HTTP 502 errors and the target group shows instances as unhealthy, meaning the application is failing health checks (or not responding correctly). However, because the Auto Scaling group is using the default EC2 health check type, it does not consider these instances unhealthy for replacement.

AWS recommends configuring the Auto Scaling group to use ELB health checks when instances serve traffic behind an ALB or NLB. With ELB health checks enabled, Auto Scaling evaluates target health as reported by the load balancer target group. If the ALB marks an instance unhealthy, the Auto Scaling group will treat that instance as unhealthy and terminate and replace it automatically, restoring capacity with healthy targets.

Why the other options are insufficient:

Cooldown period (A) affects scaling timing, not health replacement logic.

Lifecycle hook changes (B) can help with initialization timing, but they do not cause Auto Scaling to replace instances based on ALB target health unless ELB health checks are enabled.

Health check grace period (D) delays health evaluation after launch, which can reduce premature replacement, but it still won’t replace instances based on ALB target group status unless the health check type is ELB.

Therefore, switching the Auto Scaling group health check type to Elastic Load Balancing (ELB) is the correct fix.

The UnprocessedKeys element indicates that the BatchGetItem operation did not process all of the requested items in the current response. This can happen if the response size limit is exceeded or if the table’s provisioned throughput is exceeded. To handle this situation, the developer should retry the batch operation with exponential backoff and randomized delay to avoid throttling errors and reduce the load on the table. The developer should also use an AWS SDK to make the requests, as the SDKs automatically retry requests that return UnprocessedKeys.

This solution will most likely solve the issues because it will grant the IAM user the necessary permission to access the DynamoDB table using the AWS CLI command. The error message indicates that the IAM user does not have sufficient access rights to perform the scan operation on the table. Option A is not optimal because it will change the command to use put-item instead of scan, which will not achieve the desired result of getting data from the table. Option B is not optimal because it will involve contacting AWS Support, which may not be necessary or efficient for this issue. Option C is not optimal because it will state that DynamoDB cannot be accessed from the AWS CLI, which is incorrect as DynamoDB supports AWS CLI commands.

To measure how long an application spends calling downstream AWS services (for example, DynamoDB, S3, SNS, etc.) in a distributed system, the most effective AWS-native approach is AWS X-Ray with appropriate instrumentation. X-Ray provides distributed tracing by capturing end-to-end request paths and breaking each request into segments and subsegments with precise timing information. When the application is instrumented with the X-Ray SDK, client handlers/interceptors automatically create subsegments for calls to AWS services, recording latency, response status, and error/throttle indicators.

This directly satisfies the requirement: determine the length of time of calls to various downstream services. In the X-Ray trace map and trace details, the developer can see per-service timing, identify which dependency is slow, and distinguish application processing time from downstream call time. This is specifically designed for performance bottleneck analysis and root cause investigation across distributed components.

Option A (VPC Flow Logs) captures network flow metadata (source/destination, ports, bytes, accept/reject), not application-level request timing to AWS service APIs, and it won’t show the latency breakdown per downstream service call.

Option B can work only if the application is already logging detailed timing for each call, but this is manual, inconsistent across services, and does not give a unified distributed trace view. It is also higher effort than using standard tracing instrumentation.

Option C increases CloudWatch metric granularity for EC2 but does not show per-request downstream service call durations.

Therefore, implementing AWS X-Ray with client handlers is the correct solution.

This solution will meet the requirements by using IAM database authentication for Aurora, which enables using IAM roles or users to authenticate with Aurora databases instead of using passwords or other secrets. The developer can use IAM database authentication for Aurora to enable secure database connections for all the Lambda functions that access Aurora DB instance. The developer can create an IAM role with permission to connect to Aurora DB instance and attach it to each Lambda function. The developer can also configure Aurora DB instance to use IAM database authentication and enable encryption in transit using SSL certificates. This way, the Lambda functions can use a single securely encrypted database connection string to access Aurora without needing any secrets or passwords. Option B is not optimal because it will store the credentials and read them from an encrypted Amazon RDS DB instance, which may introduce additional costs and complexity for managing and accessing another RDS DB instance. Option C is not optimal because it will store the credentials in AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store as a secure string parameter, which may require additional steps or permissions to retrieve and decrypt the credentials from Parameter Store. Option D is not optimal because it will use Lambda environment variables with a shared AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) key for encryption, which may not be secure or scalable as environment variables are stored as plain text unless encrypted with AWS KMS.

In AWS Lambda, CPU power scales proportionally with the memory configuration. Lambda does not let you directly set “CPU cores” as a standalone setting in the general case; instead, increasing the function’s configured memory increases the CPU allocation (and other resources such as network throughput) available to the function. Therefore, to reduce latency caused by insufficient CPU, the developer should increase the function’s memory setting.

Option B directly addresses the CPU limitation in the supported Lambda configuration model. This is a common performance tuning approach: raise memory, benchmark, and find the optimal cost/performance point.

Option A is not the right lever for most Lambda functions because Lambda compute is configured via memory (and architecture), not by directly raising a “vCPU quota” per function in a typical tuning workflow.

Option C increases /tmp storage capacity and helps when dealing with large temporary files, not CPU availability.

Option D increases the maximum runtime allowed per invocation, but it does not give the function more CPU and will not reduce latency caused by CPU starvation.

Therefore, increasing the allocated memory is the correct way to increase CPU for a Lambda function.

Sensitive environment variables in Lambda should be protected using encryption helpers integrated with AWS KMS. Lambda environment variables are encrypted at rest, and when using a customer managed KMS key, teams can control the key policy, access, and rotation for their own microservices—matching the policy requirement that each team has “full control” over key rotation. AWS managed keys do not provide the same level of customer control over lifecycle and rotation decisions.

Therefore, the correct approach is to create customer managed KMS keys (one per team/service boundary or per microservice, depending on governance) and configure each Lambda function to use the relevant CMK for encrypting its environment variables. The Lambda execution role must have permission to use the key for decryption at runtime, typically requiring kms:Decrypt (and sometimes kms:DescribeKey depending on tooling). This is captured by Option B.

Option A and D use AWS managed keys, which do not satisfy the requirement for each team to control rotation. Rotation control (and policy ownership) is a key differentiator of customer managed keys.

Option C is not correct because the Lambda execution role does not need kms:CreateGrant and kms:Encrypt for decrypting environment variables at runtime. Over-permissioning increases risk. The Lambda service handles encryption of environment variables; the function runtime principally needs the ability to decrypt.

The AWS Serverless Application Model Command Line Interface (AWS SAM CLI) is a command-line tool for local development and testing of Serverless applications2. The sam local start-api subcommand of AWS SAM CLI is used to simulate a REST API by starting a new local endpoint3. Therefore, option D is correct.

Requirement Summary:

Simple REST endpoint for weather data

Light backend usage (POC, testing)

Wants caching support to reduce backend calls

Must be cost-effective

Evaluate Options:

B: Lambda + API Gateway + SAM

Serverless = No idle costs

API Gateway can enable caching (response caching at endpoint level)

SAM makes deployment simple and repeatable

Perfect for low-traffic testing

A: EKS + API Gateway

High overhead

Not cost-effective for POC/testing

C: ECS + API Gateway

Similar to A: Container orchestration not needed for light REST endpoint

D: Elastic Beanstalk + ALB + Lambda

Overly complex and does not directly expose Lambda

Beanstalk better suited for full apps, not small REST functions

 AWS SAM: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/serverless-application-model/latest/developerguide/what-is-sam.html

 API Gateway caching: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/apigateway/latest/developerguide/api-gateway-caching.html

 Serverless Best Practices: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/best-practices.html

Amazon CloudFront field-level encryption is specifically designed to protect sensitive fields in HTTP requests. It allows CloudFront to encrypt specific request fields at the edge using asymmetric encryption , ensuring that only authorized application components that possess the private key can decrypt the data.

This approach ensures that sensitive fields remain encrypted throughout transit and processing, while non-sensitive fields can still be accessed normally. This satisfies the requirement that only specific parts of the application can decrypt the data.

Field-level encryption is a native CloudFront capability and is far more secure and scalable than implementing custom encryption logic in Lambda@Edge or Lambda functions. AWS documentation emphasizes using built-in CloudFront security features to minimize operational overhead and reduce the risk of cryptographic implementation errors.

Options A and B introduce unnecessary complexity and custom cryptographic handling, which AWS generally discourages when managed services are available. Option D only secures transport and access control and does not encrypt individual data fields.

Therefore, CloudFront field-level encryption with asymmetric keys is the AWS-recommended and correct solution.

Why Option C is Correct:Implementing a connection pool in the Redis client reduces connection overhead and avoids frequent connection establishment, which helps to reduce latency and connection failures.

Why Other Options are Incorrect:

Option A: Exponential backoff retry strategies help with transient failures but do not resolve latency caused by frequent connection establishment.

Option B: Storing scores in application memory adds complexity and risks inconsistency.

Option D: Adding more nodes is unnecessary unless the cluster is under heavy load. Latency due to connection failures is better addressed at the application level.

AWS Documentation References:

Amazon ElastiCache Best Practices

AWS Lambda combined with Amazon S3 event notifications provides the most cost-effective and lowest-latency solution for processing objects uploaded to S3. AWS documentation states that S3 event notifications can invoke Lambda functions immediately after object creation, eliminating delays associated with polling or scheduled execution.

Because the data arrives only about 10 times per day and processing completes quickly, Lambda is ideal due to its pay-per-invocation pricing model . There is no need to maintain always-on infrastructure, which significantly reduces cost compared to running EC2 instances. The developer pays only for execution time and requests.

Using CloudWatch alarms (Option A) or scheduled events (Option C) introduces unnecessary latency and complexity. These approaches either delay processing or require periodic checks rather than reacting instantly to object uploads. Polling from EC2 (Option D) is the most expensive and least efficient option because it requires continuously running compute resources.

AWS best practices for event-driven architectures explicitly recommend S3 event notifications → Lambda for near-real-time processing of uploaded data. This approach minimizes operational overhead, achieves near-zero idle cost, and provides the fastest possible response to new data.

Therefore, invoking a Lambda function directly through an S3 event notification is the optimal solution.

For service-to-service calls inside AWS, the simplest and most secure way to authenticate a caller (Lambda) to an API Gateway HTTP API is to use IAM authorization . When IAM auth is enabled on a route, API Gateway requires requests to be signed with AWS Signature Version 4 (SigV4) . The calling Lambda function can sign the request using the AWS SDK (or SigV4 utilities) and its execution role credentials .

With this approach, you grant the Lambda function’s execution role explicit permission to invoke the API by allowing the execute-api:Invoke action on the API’s ARN. API Gateway then evaluates the SigV4-signed request against IAM to decide whether to authorize the call. This creates a clean, auditable permission model and avoids embedding static secrets.

Option A is incorrect and overly complex: JWT authorizers are typically used for end-user or workload identities from an OIDC/JWT provider; creating an IAM IdP is not how you enable JWT authorizers for HTTP APIs, and it does not directly solve Lambda-to-API authentication. Option C (API keys) is not considered an authentication mechanism for HTTP APIs in the same way; API keys are primarily for usage plans/throttling (and are more common with REST APIs). Storing an API key in environment variables is also weaker than IAM-based, short-lived credentials. Option D is backwards: a Lambda resource-based policy controls who can invoke the Lambda function, not who can call an API Gateway endpoint.

Therefore, B is the correct solution: enable IAM authorization on the HTTP API route and grant the Lambda function’s IAM role permission to invoke the API (and sign requests with SigV4).

To meet the requirement that developers cannot view credit card numbers while the fraud detection account can , the solution must (1) ensure the sensitive data is masked at ingestion/storage in CloudWatch Logs, and (2) allow only an authorized principal to view unmasked values .

First, the developers must attach the data protection policy to the CloudWatch log group that receives the API Gateway HTTP API access logs (and/or the Lambda log group if credit card numbers can appear there). A CloudWatch Logs data protection policy is applied at the log group level and instructs CloudWatch Logs to identify sensitive data using managed data identifiers (for example, CreditCardNumber ) and then apply the configured de-identification action (here, masking). Without attaching the policy to the log group, the masking/redaction behavior will not be enforced for newly ingested log events, and developers could still see raw request parameters.

Second, to permit only the fraud detection account to reveal the masked values when necessary, the IAM role that the fraud detection account assumes must have the specific CloudWatch Logs permission to unmask protected data. Granting logs:Unmask to that role enables authorized access to view the sensitive values while keeping them masked for everyone else who lacks that permission (such as developer accounts assuming other roles).

Options A and E are not required for CloudWatch Logs data protection enforcement; the core controls are log-group policy attachment (to perform masking) and IAM authorization (to permit unmasking only for the fraud role). Therefore, the correct combination is C (apply the policy to the log group that captures the HTTP API logs) and B (grant logs:Unmask to the fraud detection role).

The correct answer is A because the requirement is to encrypt data in transit and data at rest while ensuring that the developer can manage encryption keys . AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) is the AWS-managed service specifically designed for creating, controlling, and auditing cryptographic keys. When used with the AWS Encryption SDK , it supports envelope encryption , a recommended pattern for protecting sensitive application data.

In this model, the application uses data keys to encrypt the actual sensitive data, while AWS KMS protects and manages the master keys that encrypt those data keys. This provides strong security and centralized key management, including access control through IAM, key rotation options, and auditability through AWS logging integrations. For data in transit , the application should also use TLS/HTTPS , which is standard AWS guidance for secure communications.

Option B is incorrect because Parameter Store is not the correct mechanism for directly managing application encryption keys in this way. SecureString protects stored values, but it is not a substitute for using KMS as the primary managed key service for encryption architecture. Option C is incorrect because Secrets Manager is intended for storing secrets such as passwords and tokens, not as the main key management system for application encryption design. Option D is incorrect because SSE-S3 uses Amazon S3-managed keys, not customer-managed KMS keys, so it does not satisfy the requirement that the developer be able to manage encryption keys.

Therefore, AWS KMS with envelope encryption through the AWS Encryption SDK is the most appropriate and secure solution.

For client-side encryption with AWS KMS, the documented pattern is envelope encryption : you use KMS to generate and protect a data encryption key (DEK) , and you use that DEK locally to encrypt the actual data. This is the correct approach for large payloads (such as 10 MB documents), because the KMS Encrypt API is intended for encrypting small amounts of data (KMS is not designed to directly encrypt multi-megabyte application payloads).

With envelope encryption, the application calls GenerateDataKey on AWS KMS, specifying the KMS key (customer managed key) to use. KMS returns two versions of the DEK in the response:

a plaintext DEK (usable immediately by the application for local cryptographic operations), and

a ciphertext (encrypted) DEK that is encrypted under the specified KMS key.

The application then uses the plaintext DEK to encrypt the 10 MB document on the client side (for example, using an authenticated encryption mode such as AES-GCM via a standard crypto library). After encryption completes, the application must not persist the plaintext DEK; instead, it stores the encrypted document alongside the ciphertext DEK . Later, to decrypt, the application sends the ciphertext DEK to KMS using Decrypt to recover the plaintext DEK, and then decrypts the document locally.

Therefore, option D is correct because it explicitly uses GenerateDataKey and the plaintext DEK to encrypt the data, which is the required envelope-encryption flow. Options A, B, and C do not follow the correct KMS envelope-encryption process for large client-side payloads.

This solution will meet the requirements by using AWS Secrets Manager, which is a service that helps protect secrets such as database credentials by encrypting them with AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) and enabling automatic rotation of secrets. The developer can use an AWS Secrets Manager resource in AWS CloudFormation template, which enables creating and managing secrets as part of a CloudFormation stack. The developer can use an AWS::SecretsManager::Secret resource type to generate and rotate the password for accessing RDS database during deployment. The developer can also specify a RotationSchedule property for the secret resource, which defines how often to rotate the secret and which Lambda function to use for rotation logic. Option A is not optimal because it will use an AWS Lambda function as a CloudFormation custom resource, which may introduce additional complexity and overhead for creating and managing a custom resource and implementing rotation logic. Option B is not optimal because it will use an AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store resource with the SecureString data type, which does not support automatic rotation of secrets. Option C is not optimal because it will use a cron daemon on the application’s host to generate and rotate the password, which may incur more costs and require more maintenance for running and securing a host.

This step should be completed prior to deploying the application because it prepares the application artifacts for deployment. The AWS Serverless Application Model (AWS SAM) is a framework that simplifies building and deploying serverless applications on AWS. The AWS SAM CLI is a command-line tool that helps you create, test, and deploy serverless applications using AWS SAM templates. The sam package command bundles the application artifacts, such as Lambda function code and API definitions, and uploads them to an Amazon S3 bucket. The command also returns a CloudFormation template that is ready to be deployed with the sam deploy command. Compressing the application to a zip file and uploading it to AWS Lambda will not work because it does not use AWS SAM templates or CloudFormation. Testing the new Lambda function by first tracing it in AWS X-Ray will not prepare the application for deployment, but only monitor its performance and errors. Creating the application environment using the eb create my-env command will not work because it is a command for AWS Elastic Beanstalk, not AWS SAM.

This solution allows the developer to overcome the limit for the combined maximum of characters for environment variables in AWS CodeBuild. AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store provides secure, hierarchical storage for configuration data management and secrets management. The developer can store large numbers of environment variables as parameters in Parameter Store and reference them in the buildspec file using parameter references. Adding export LC_ALL=“en_US.utf8” command to the pre_build section will not affect the environment variables limit. Using Amazon Cognito or an Amazon S3 bucket to store key-value pairs for environment variables will require additional configuration and integration.