212-89 ECCouncil EC Council Certified Incident Handler (ECIH v3) Free Practice Exam Questions (2026 Updated)

An active assessment involves using automated tools to scan and probe the network actively to identify hosts, services, and vulnerabilities. This type of assessment directly interacts with the network components to gather information about the existing security posture, unlike passive assessments, which analyze traffic without sending packets to the target systems. Dickson's approach, employing automated tools to identify the network's hosts, services, and vulnerabilities, fits the definition of an active assessment. This method provides a more immediate understanding of the network's vulnerabilities, allowing for timely remediation actions.

Risk assessment is the risk management process that involves identifying risks, estimating their impact on the organization, and determining the sources of those risks to recommend appropriate mitigation measures. The goal of a risk assessment is to understand the nature of potential threats, vulnerabilities, and the consequences of those risks materializing, allowing an organization to make informed decisions about how to address them effectively. Risk assumption involves accepting the potential impact of a risk, risk mitigation focuses on reducing the likelihood or impact of risks, and risk avoidance involves taking actions to avoid the risk entirely.

The described symptoms—numerous incomplete TCP connections consuming server resources—are characteristic of a SYN flood attack, a denial-of-service technique targeting the transport layer. In such attacks, attackers send SYN packets without completing the TCP handshake, leaving servers overwhelmed with half-open connections.

ECIH network incident handling guidance emphasizes rapid identification and containment of DoS conditions to preserve service availability. By configuring the router to validate connection requests (for example, using SYN cookies or proxy validation), illegitimate handshake attempts are filtered before reaching the server.

Option A involves payload inspection, which is irrelevant here. Option B relates to authentication attacks, which require completed connections. Option D is a detection activity, not mitigation.

Therefore, the purpose of Sophia’s action was to block SYN flood attempts, making Option C correct.

This incident is a textbook example of whaling, a specialized form of phishing that targets senior executives or impersonates them to exploit authority and trust. According to the ECIH Email Security module, whaling attacks often focus on financial fraud, such as wire transfer requests or invoice manipulation, and are designed to bypass normal controls through urgency and executive impersonation.

Option A is correct because the attacker impersonated the CEO and targeted employees responsible for financial actions. The minor domain alteration and authoritative language are classic whaling indicators.

Option B refers to overwhelming inboxes with large volumes of mail. Option C involves automated credential testing. Option D targets mobile messaging platforms.

Jason’s response—header analysis, identity verification, firewall blocking, financial alerting, and organization-wide notification—aligns with ECIH best practices for handling executive impersonation attacks. Recognizing the attack type correctly is critical for appropriate escalation and mitigation, making Option A the correct answer.

ECIH forensic readiness guidance stresses that forensic imaging with hash verification is the gold standard for preserving evidence integrity. Option B is correct because it ensures data integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation.

Creating a bit-by-bit forensic image preserves original evidence while allowing analysis on copies. Hash verification confirms that no alterations occur during acquisition or transport. Encrypted storage protects confidentiality, and detailed logs support chain of custody.

Options A, C, and D lack one or more critical forensic requirements such as hash validation or evidentiary isolation. ECIH explicitly warns against relying solely on physical transport or live data transfers.

In the incident handling and response (IH&R) process, backing up the data on affected systems is a critical step that usually falls under the Containment phase. The Containment phase is crucial for limiting the scope and severity of an incident, ensuring that it does not spread further or affect additional systems. Backing up affected systems during containment is essential for several reasons: it preserves a snapshot of the system in its current state for forensic analysis, ensures that data is not lost if the system needs to be wiped or altered during the response process, and helps in the recovery process if data is corrupted or lost.

By performing a complete backup of the infected system during the Containment phase, Alice ensures that there is a reliable copy of all data and system states before any major actions, such as eradication or deeper forensic analysis, are taken. This step is also preparatory for the potential use of the backup in analyzing how the incident occurred and in restoring system functionality after the incident is resolved.

The port scanning technique that involves resetting the TCP connection between the client and server abruptly before the completion of the three-way handshake, thereby leaving the connection half-open, is known as a Stealth scan (also referred to as a SYN scan). This technique allows the scanner to inquire about the status of a port without establishing a full TCP connection, making the scan less detectible to intrusion detection systems and less likely to be logged by the target. It's a method used to discreetly discover open ports on a target machine without establishing a full connection that would be visible in logs.

In the practice of digital forensics and incident handling, evidence bags play a crucial role in preserving the integrity and chain of custody of physical and digital evidence. The information typically included in the documentation on evidence bags encompasses the date and time of seizure, which provides a timestamp for when the evidence was collected; the exhibit number, which is a unique identifier assigned to each piece of evidence for tracking and reference purposes; and the name of the incident responder or individual who collected the evidence, ensuring accountability and traceability. This documentation is essential for maintaining the chain of custody, a critical element in legal proceedings, as it helps establish the evidence's authenticity and integrity by detailing its handling from collection to presentation in court. Options A, B, and C describe types of digital evidence but are not directly related to the content typically documented on evidence bags.

Incident triage is the phase in the incident handling and response process where identified security incidents are analyzed, validated, categorized, and prioritized. This step is critical for determining the severity of incidents and deciding on the allocation of resources for effective response. It involves initial analysis to understand the nature of the incident, its impact, and urgency, which guides the subsequent response actions.

The ECIH Introduction to Incident Handling module identifies social engineering as a primary method attackers use to gain unauthorized access without exploiting technical vulnerabilities.

Option C is correct because the attack relied on deception—spoofed notifications and lookalike domains—to trick users into disclosing credentials. This is a classic social engineering technique, often used as the initial access vector.

Options A, B, and D are technical reconnaissance or network attacks, not human-focused deception.

Recognizing social engineering as the root cause is essential for selecting appropriate remediation actions such as user awareness training, phishing defenses, and MFA, all emphasized in ECIH guidance.

This scenario highlights violations of forensic readiness and safe malware handling, which are explicitly covered in the ECIH First Response and Malware Analysis modules. ECIH stresses that malware samples must never be handled on production or enterprise-connected systems, as this creates a high risk of accidental execution, lateral infection, and organizational impact.

Option A is correct because ECIH mandates that malicious code samples be stored in isolated, non-networked environments and renamed with non-executable extensions (for example, .malware, .bin, or .txt) to prevent accidental execution. This practice ensures operational safety and preserves forensic integrity.

Option B improves confidentiality but does not prevent accidental execution. Option C supports documentation but does not mitigate execution risk. Option D aids classification but does not address safe handling.

The described behavior—handling live malware on enterprise systems without isolation or renaming—directly contradicts ECIH best practices. Proper sample isolation, renaming, and access restriction are mandatory controls to prevent secondary incidents during investigations, making Option A the correct answer.

ECIH prioritizes containment of the most critical threat vector. The primary server actively exfiltrating data represents the highest risk.

Option B is correct because isolating the primary server immediately stops data loss and attacker control. IoT remediation can follow once core assets are secured.

Options A and D delay containment. Option C causes unnecessary disruption.

ECIH stresses that responders must address the most damaging threat first, making Option B correct.

In the context of collecting physical evidence during a cyber forensic investigation, Patrick must consider items like removable media, cables, and publications. These items can contain crucial information related to the crime, such as data storage devices (USB drives, external hard drives), cables connected to potentially relevant devices, and any printed materials that might have information or clues about the incident. Open ports, services, and OS vulnerabilities, DNS information, and published name servers and web application source code, while important in digital forensics, do not constitute physical evidence in the traditional sense.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum explains that insider threat investigations frequently depend on endpoint monitoring and user behavior analytics (UBA/UEBA). In this case, the Nuix Adaptive Security tool captured screenshots, file metadata, and keystroke logs—forms of host-level monitoring that directly observe user activity on the endpoint.

User behavior analytics focuses on detecting deviations from normal patterns, such as sending attachments to unknown external addresses during non-business hours. ECIH identifies this as anomalous insider behavior indicative of potential data exfiltration. Endpoint monitoring tools provide detailed artifacts including screen captures, application usage logs, keystroke records, and file transfer metadata, which are critical for forensic analysis and evidence preservation.

Option B (SIEM event correlation) aggregates logs from multiple systems but does not typically capture screenshots or keystroke-level data. Option C (network forensics) focuses on packet captures and traffic analysis rather than user-level interaction evidence. Option D (host-based intrusion prevention systems) primarily block or detect malicious activity but do not provide comprehensive behavioral monitoring data like screenshots and keystroke logs.

ECIH emphasizes that insider threat cases rely heavily on behavioral indicators, digital activity reconstruction, and endpoint telemetry to determine intent and scope. Lina’s reliance on user activity reconstruction and endpoint-level artifacts clearly aligns with user behavior analytics and endpoint monitoring.

Therefore, the correct answer is User behavior analytics and endpoint monitoring.

A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is characterized by flooding the network with a high volume of traffic to consume all available network resources, preventing intended or authorized users from accessing system, network, or applications. This type of attack aims to overwhelm the target's capacity to handle incoming requests, causing a denial of access to legitimate users. Unlike XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) attacks, URL manipulation, or SQL injection, which exploit vulnerabilities in web applications for unauthorized data access or manipulation, a DoS attack specifically targets the availability of services.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum emphasizes that incident response includes both logical and physical security controls. Physical breaches can directly lead to data compromise, hardware tampering, or insider-enabled attacks. In this case, the breach occurred due to badge sharing, a common weakness in physical access control systems that rely solely on single-factor authentication.

Dual authentication (two-factor authentication) in physical security typically combines something the user has (access card or badge) with something the user is (biometric verification such as fingerprint or iris scan). The absence of biometric validation allowed the contract worker to misuse another employee’s badge without detection.

ECIH highlights that effective forensic readiness includes strong access controls, surveillance integration, and identity verification mechanisms to prevent unauthorized facility access. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) for physical entry ensures accountability, prevents impersonation, and strengthens audit trails.

Option A (patch management) addresses system vulnerabilities, not physical access misuse. Option C (firewall segmentation) is a network control unrelated to physical facility entry. Option D (encrypted file systems) protects stored data but does not prevent unauthorized physical presence in restricted areas.

By implementing dual authentication with biometric verification, the organization would have significantly reduced the likelihood of badge misuse and improved accountability, aligning with ECIH’s layered security and preventive control principles.

In the static data collection process, which is part of digital forensics and incident handling, the focus is on acquiring and examining digital evidence without altering the system or the data itself. This process includes evidence examination, where the data is analyzed; system preservation, where the current state of a system or data is maintained to ensure no alteration occurs; and evidence acquisition, which involves creating an exact binary copy of the digital evidence. Password protection, however, is not a part of the static data collection process. Instead, it relates to securing access to data or systems but does not directly involve the collection or preservation of static data for forensic purposes.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum highlights the Shared Responsibility Model in cloud environments. Cloud providers are responsible for security of the cloud (infrastructure), while customers are responsible for security in the cloud (applications, data, access control).

Confusion over responsibility leads to delayed incident response, misconfigurations, and security gaps. ECIH emphasizes clearly defining roles between cloud providers and internal teams before incidents occur, including logging, monitoring, access management, and incident handling responsibilities.

Option A improves security posture but does not resolve responsibility confusion. Option B improperly shifts all responsibility to the provider, which contradicts the shared model. Option D relates to operational configuration, not governance clarity.

Therefore, understanding shared responsibilities for incident response in cloud environments is critical to effectively managing cloud security incidents.

This scenario reflects misuse of system resources, a category defined in ECIH network and endpoint incident classification.

Option C is correct because unauthorized software caused excessive CPU usage and system strain, violating acceptable use policies.

Options A, B, and D do not match the behavior described.

ECIH classifies such activity as a security incident because it impacts availability, performance, and risk exposure.