212-89 ECCouncil EC Council Certified Incident Handler (ECIH v3) Free Practice Exam Questions (2026 Updated)

Wireshark is a network protocol analyzer that allows users to capture and interactively browse the traffic running on a computer network. It is a crucial tool for incident responders like Eric who are developing incident-handling plans and need to analyze network traffic and patterns. Wireshark can provide detailed information about the network, including protocols used, source and destination of packets, and potential signs of malicious activity, making it invaluable for developing informed policies and procedures.

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF or XSRF) is an attack that tricks the victim's browser into executing unauthorized actions on a website where they are currently authenticated. In this scenario, the attacker exploits the trust that a site has in the user's browser, effectively forcing the browser to perform actions without the user's knowledge or consent. For example, if the user is logged into their bank's website, an attacker could craft a malicious request to transfer funds without the user's direct interaction. CSRF attacks rely on authenticated sessions and typically target state-changing requests to compromise user or application data.

Nation-state attribution involves identifying a specific country or government as the sponsor behind a cyber-attack or intrusion. This type of threat attribution is focused on determining the involvement of state actors in cyber operations against specific targets, which often involves sophisticated, well-planned, and executed cyber campaigns. Alexis's efforts to identify and attribute the actors behind the attack to a specific nation-state fall under this category, as she seeks to uncover the geopolitical motives and the extent of state sponsorship behind the incident. Nation-state attribution requires analyzing a variety of indicators, including technical evidence, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and contextual intelligence. This is distinct from campaign attribution, which focuses on linking attacks to a specific campaign or operation, true attribution, which aims at identifying the actual individuals behind an attack, and intrusion set attribution, which involves attributing a set of malicious activities to a particular threat actor or group.

The indicators described align closely with a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack, a major topic in the ECIH Network Security Incidents module. DDoS attacks overwhelm network and system resources using traffic from multiple sources, often distributed across geographic regions.

Excessive ARP traffic, NAT table exhaustion, elevated CPU usage on routers, and simultaneous connection attempts are classic symptoms of volumetric and protocol-based DDoS attacks. The involvement of multiple geolocations, as reported by the ISP, further confirms the distributed nature of the attack.

Option B is correct because no single-host misconfiguration or reconnaissance activity would generate this volume and diversity of traffic. Option A would cause IP conflicts, not global traffic floods. Option C focuses on stealthy outbound activity, not inbound saturation. Option D is low-volume and targeted.

ECIH emphasizes early identification of DDoS conditions to enable rapid containment using rate limiting, blackholing, or ISP coordination. Recognizing these indicators is critical to protecting service availability.

This scenario directly reflects crime scene documentation and physical reconstruction, a core principle in the Forensic Readiness and First Response module of the ECIH curriculum. First responders must assume that every physical detail may later become relevant in court proceedings or advanced forensic reconstruction.

Option A is correct because Tara’s actions—photographing cable connections, labeling ports, documenting power states, and noting spatial orientation—are explicitly designed to allow investigators to recreate the original physical environment. ECIH emphasizes that improper documentation of physical layout can invalidate conclusions about device usage, peripheral connections, or data paths.

Option B is incorrect because uptime continuity is not her objective. Option C refers to live system analysis, which she is not performing. Option D applies to digital evidence integrity after acquisition, not scene documentation.

ECIH stresses that physical reconstruction references are especially important in insider threat investigations, where proving who had access, which devices were connected, and how data could have been transferred is critical. Tara’s approach ensures forensic soundness, minimizes contamination risk, and preserves contextual evidence.

Eradication is the phase in the incident response process where the root cause of an incident is removed or eliminated, and all attack vectors are closed to prevent similar incidents in the future. This step follows the containment phase, where the immediate threat is isolated to prevent further damage, and precedes the recovery phase, where normal operations are restored. Eradication involves thoroughly removing malware, unauthorized access mechanisms, or any other elements used in the attack, and securing any vulnerabilities that were exploited. The goal is to ensure that the threat cannot re-emerge and that the systems are secure before they are returned to operational status.

The Slowloris attack is a type of application-layer attack that targets the web server by establishing and maintaining many simultaneous HTTP connections to the target server. Unlike traditional network-layer DoS/DDoS attacks such as UDP flood or SYN flood, Slowloris is designed to hold as many connections to the target web server open for as long as possible. It does so by sending partial requests, which are never completed, and periodically sending subsequent HTTP headers to keep the connections open. This consumes the server's resources, leading to denial of service as legitimate users cannot establish connections. The Slowloris attack is effective even against servers with a high bandwidth because it targets the server's connection pool, not its network bandwidth.

Shally has incorporated the Defense-in-depth strategy into the incident response plan for Texas Pvt. Ltd. Defense-in-depth is a layered security approach that involves implementing multiple security measures and controls throughout an information system. This strategy is designed to provide several defensive barriers to protect against threats and attacks, ensuring that if one layer is compromised, others still provide protection. The goal is to create a multi-faceted defense that addresses potential vulnerabilities in various areas, including physical security, network security, application security, and user education.

Live data acquisition is the process of collecting volatile data from a system that is still running. Volatile data includes information stored in system memory (RAM), cache, and system and network configuration settings that are lost when the system is powered off. This method is essential for capturing data that can provide insights into the state of the system at the time of an incident, including active network connections, running processes, and the contents of memory. Marley must employ live data acquisition to ensure that this crucial and ephemeral data is not lost, which can be pivotal in understanding and responding to the incident effectively.

Rachel is applying the forensic principle of preserving volatile and screen-based digital evidence, which is a core concept in the ECIH First Response and Digital Forensics modules. When a mobile device is powered on and unlocked, the data visible on the screen—such as messages, timestamps, sender details, and session states—constitutes volatile evidence that may be lost permanently if the device locks, reboots, or powers off.

ECIH guidance instructs first responders to document the live state of a device before any interaction that could alter its condition. Photographing the screen captures evidence that may not be recoverable later due to encryption or session expiration. Maintaining power ensures the device does not enter a locked or encrypted state during transport.

Option A refers to forensic analysis, not first response. Option C would destroy evidence and violates forensic principles. Option D risks loss of volatile data.

Preserving screen-based evidence ensures integrity, admissibility, and continuity of evidence, making Option B correct.

Racheal should check for DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) in the email headers to analyze the authenticity of received emails. DKIM is an email authentication method designed to detect email spoofing. It provides a way for the receiver to check that an email claimed to have come from a specific domain was indeed authorized by the owner of that domain. It achieves this by affixing a digital signature, linked to a domain name, to each outgoing email message. The recipient can verify this signature to confirm that the email was not altered during its transmission and that it indeed comes from the specified domain, thereby helping to prevent email spoofing. Other options like SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol), POP (Post Office Protocol), and ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) are not directly related to email authenticity checks.

This scenario demonstrates a preventive containment action during an email security incident. The ECIH Email Security Incident Handling module emphasizes that once phishing is identified, responders should immediately prevent further delivery to reduce organizational exposure.

Option A is correct because Lena removes malicious emails from the mail server’s delivery queue before users receive them. This action directly reduces risk by preventing additional users from clicking malicious links or submitting credentials. ECIH identifies email purging as a critical containment technique during active phishing campaigns.

Option B is an investigative action, not containment. Option C applies after delivery and compromise. Option D addresses already compromised accounts rather than preventing exposure.

By stopping malicious emails before delivery, Lena aligns with ECIH best practices for rapid containment of email-based threats.

Incident triage is the phase in the Incident Handling and Response (IH&R) process where identified security incidents are analyzed, validated, categorized, and prioritized. This step is crucial for determining the severity of incidents and deciding on the order in which they should be addressed. During triage, incident handlers assess the impact, urgency, and potential harm of an incident to prioritize their response efforts effectively. This ensures that resources are allocated efficiently, and the most critical incidents are handled first. Incident recording and assignment involve logging incidents and assigning them to handlers, containment focuses on limiting the extent of damage, and notification involves informing stakeholders about the incident.

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a framework used to manage digital certificates and public-key encryption. It enables secure electronic transfer of information for a range of network activities such as e-commerce, internet banking, and confidential email. PKI is fundamental to the management of encryption keys and digital certificates, ensuring the secure exchange of data over networks and verification of identity.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum describes Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR) platforms as integrated systems that combine automated detection, case management, workflow execution, and coordinated response actions.

The scenario includes automated abnormal behavior detection, endpoint isolation, log correlation, automatic incident ticket creation, asset mapping, user activity analysis, and adaptive containment using predefined workflows with analyst oversight. These capabilities align directly with incident response automation and orchestration technologies.

ECIH emphasizes that modern IR programs integrate SIEM, endpoint detection and response (EDR), and orchestration platforms to streamline alert triage, automate containment steps, and reduce response time. Automation ensures rapid isolation of infected systems, while orchestration coordinates multiple tools and teams across departments.

Option A lacks automation. Option B (legacy antivirus) cannot perform coordinated isolation and workflow execution. Option C (backup system) supports recovery but not detection or containment.

Therefore, a coordinated system combining incident response automation with orchestration capabilities best supports the described workflow.

The correct flow of stages in an Incident Handling and Response (IH&R) process as outlined in the Incident Handler (ECIH v3) by EC-Council begins with Preparation. This phase involves getting ready for potential incidents by developing plans, policies, and procedures, and ensuring that tools and team training are up to date. Incident Recording is the next stage, where incidents are documented and reported. Incident Triage follows, prioritizing incidents based on their impact and urgency. Containment is next, aiming to limit the damage of the incident and prevent further spread. Eradication comes after containment, where the root cause of the incident is removed. Recovery is the stage where affected systems are restored to their operational status. Post-Incident Activities conclude the process, reviewing and learning from the incident to improve future response efforts.

This scenario reflects the post-incident recovery and reporting phase outlined in the ECIH curriculum. After containment and eradication, organizations must address legal, regulatory, and investigative requirements, especially when financial fraud and executive compromise are involved.

Option A is correct because forwarding detailed incident reports to a government cybercrime agency constitutes legal escalation and investigation support. ECIH stresses the importance of cooperation with law enforcement in cases involving fraud, financial loss, or cross-border criminal activity. Proper documentation supports potential prosecution, restitution efforts, and regulatory compliance.

Options B, C, and D are technical recovery actions unrelated to legal follow-up.

By engaging authorities with verified evidence, the organization fulfills its recovery obligations beyond technical remediation, aligning with ECIH best practices.

ECIH insider threat guidance emphasizes continuous monitoring and behavioral analysis combined with background checks as the most effective deterrent against malicious insiders.

Option D is correct because insider threats often evolve after hiring. Continuous monitoring detects abnormal behavior patterns that static vetting cannot.

Options A–C are insufficient or ineffective against sophisticated insider threats.