HPE6-A84 HP Aruba Certified Network Security Expert Written Exam Free Practice Exam Questions (2025 Updated)

The UBT solution requires that the edge ports on the switches are configured in VLAN trunk mode, not access mode. This is because the UBT solution uses a special VLAN (VLAN 4095 by default) to encapsulate the user traffic and tunnel it to the gateway. The edge ports need to allow this VLAN as well as any other VLANs that are used for management or control traffic. Therefore, the edge ports should be configured as VLAN trunk ports and allow the necessary VLANs1

BPDU (Bridge Protocol Data Unit) is a message that is exchanged between switches to maintain the spanning tree topology and prevent loops. BPDU protection and BPDU filtering are two features that can be configured on AOS-CX switch ports to enhance security and performance.

BPDU protection is a feature that disables a port if it receives a BPDU, indicating that an unauthorized switch or device has been connected to the port. BPDU protection is typically used on edge ports, which are ports that connect to end devices such as PCs or printers, and are not expected to receive BPDUs. BPDU protection prevents rogue devices from connecting to the network and affecting the spanning tree topology.

BPDU filtering is a feature that prevents a port from sending or receiving BPDUs, effectively isolating the port from the spanning tree topology. BPDU filtering is typically used on inter-switch ports, which are ports that connect to other switches, for specialized use cases such as creating a separate spanning tree domain or reducing the overhead of BPDUs. BPDU filtering should be used with caution, as it can create loops or inconsistencies in the network.

You can find more information about how to configure BPDU protection and BPDU filtering on AOS-CX switch ports in the [Configuring Spanning Tree Protocol - Aruba] page and the [AOS-CX Switching Configuration Guide] page. The other options are not correct because they either use BPDU protection or BPDU filtering on the wrong type of ports or for the wrong purpose. For example, using BPDU protection on inter-switch ports would disable the ports if they receive BPDUs, which are expected in normal operation. Using BPDU filtering on edge ports would allow rogue devices to connect to the network and create loops or affect the spanning tree topology.

MAC Authentication Bypass (MAB) is a technique that allows non-802.1X-capable devices to bypass the 802.1X authentication process and gain network access based on their MAC addresses. However, MAB has some security drawbacks, such as the possibility of MAC address spoofing or unauthorized devices being added to the network. Therefore, it is recommended to use a custom MAC-Auth authentication method that adds an additional layer of security to MAB.

A custom MAC-Auth authentication method is a method that uses a combination of the MAC address and another attribute, such as a username, password, or certificate, to authenticate the device. This way, the device needs to provide both the MAC address and the additional attribute to gain access, making it harder for an attacker to spoof or impersonate the device. A custom MAC-Auth authentication method can be created and configured in ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) by following the steps in the Customizing MAC Authentication - Aruba page.

According to the Aruba Cloud Authentication and Policy Overview1, Device Insight tags are stored in the Endpoint Repository and can be used as conditions within CPPM role mapping or enforcement policy rules. The rule condition type should be Endpoint, and the attribute should be Device Insight Tags. No extra authorization source is required for services that use policies with these rules. Therefore, option D is the correct answer.

Option A is incorrect because creating an HTTP authentication source to the Central API is not necessary to use Device Insight tags as conditions. Device Insight tags are already synchronized between Central and CPPM, and can be accessed from the Endpoint Repository.

Option B is incorrect because using the Application type for the rule conditions is not applicable to Device Insight tags. The Application type is used to match attributes from the Application Authentication source, which is used to integrate with third-party applications such as Microsoft Intune or Google G Suite.

Option C is incorrect because using the Endpoints Repository type for the rule conditions is not valid for Device Insight tags. The Endpoints Repository type is used to match attributes from the Endpoints Repository source, which is different from the Endpoint type. The Endpoints Repository source contains information about endpoints that are manually added or imported into CPPM, while the Endpoint type contains information about endpoints that are dynamically discovered and profiled by CPPM or Device Insight. Adding Endpoints Repository as a secondary authentication source for services that use policies with these rules is also unnecessary and redundant.

This is because a downloadable user role (DUR) is a feature that allows the switch to use a central ClearPass server to download user-roles to the switch for authenticated users12 A DUR can contain various attributes and rules that define the access level and privileges of the user, such as VLAN, ACL, PoE, reauthentication period, etc3 A DUR can also be customized and updated on the ClearPass server without requiring any changes on the switch1

A DUR can be used to create a “provision” role that allows users to enroll new wired clients in Intune. The “provision” role can have limited access that only lets them enroll and receive certificates from the Intune service. The “provision” role can also have rules that restrict the Internet access of the users to only the necessary sites, such as the Intune portal and the certificate authority. The rules can be based on IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, depending on the network configuration and preference2

A. Configuring the rules for the “provision” role with IPv6 addresses, which tend to be more stable. This is not a valid recommendation because it does not address how to create and apply the “provision” role on the switch. Moreover, IPv6 addresses do not necessarily tend to be more stable than IPv4 addresses, as both protocols have their own advantages and disadvantages4

B. Enabling tunneling to the MCs on the “provision” role and then setting up the privileges on the MCs. This is not a valid recommendation because it does not explain how to enable tunneling or what MCs are. Moreover, tunneling is a technique that encapsulates one network protocol within another, which adds complexity and overhead to the network communication5

D. Assigning the “provision” role to a VLAN and then setting up the rules within a Layer 2 access control list (ACL). This is not a valid recommendation because it does not explain how to assign a role to a VLAN or how to create a Layer 2 ACL on the switch. Moreover, a Layer 2 ACL is limited in its filtering capabilities, as it can only match on MAC addresses or Ethernet types, which might not be sufficient for restricting Internet access to specific sites

This option allows CPPM to receive real-time information about the network activity and security posture of the clients from the firewall, and then apply appropriate enforcement actions based on the configured policies 12. For example, if a client is detected to be infected with malware or violating the network usage policy, CPPM can quarantine or disconnect the client from the network 2.

To use Azure AD as the authentication source in 802.1X services, you need to configure CPPM as a SAML service provider and Azure AD as a SAML identity provider. This allows CPPM to use Azure AD for user authentication and role mapping. To do this, you need to create an app registration on Azure AD that references the CPPM’s FQDN as the reply URL and the entity ID. You also need to grant the app registration the required permissions to access user information from Azure AD1

A DNS SAN (Subject Alternative Name) is an extension of the X.509 certificate standard that allows specifying additional hostnames or IP addresses that the certificate can be used for. A DNS SAN is useful for validating the identity of the server or client that presents the certificate, especially when the common name (CN) field does not match the hostname or IP address of the server or client.

In this case, the certificate has a CN of mc41.site94.example.com, which is the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the standalone Aruba Mobility Controller (MC). However, this CN may not match the hostname or IP address that the MC uses for the Web UI or for implementing RadSec with Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager. For example, if the MC uses a different FQDN, such as mc41.example.com, or an IP address, such as 192.168.1.41, for these purposes, then the certificate would not be valid for them. Therefore, the certificate should have a DNS SAN that includes all the possible hostnames or IP addresses that the MC may use for the Web UI and RadSec.

This is because the Live Events monitoring tool is a feature that allows you to view and filter real-time events and alerts from your network devices and clients on Aruba Central. You can use the Live Events monitoring tool to detect which IoT clients have used SSH by applying the following filters:

Category: IoT

Application: SSH

The Live Events monitoring tool will then display a list of all the IoT clients that have used SSH, along with other information such as their IP address, MAC address, hostname, SSID, AP name, etc. You can also export the list as a CSV file for further analysis or reporting.

A. Create and apply a Central client profile tag that selects the SSH application and the clients’ category. This is not the fastest way to find a list of all the IoT clients that have used SSH because creating and applying a client profile tag is a process that involves several steps and might take some time to take effect. A client profile tag is a feature that allows you to group and classify clients based on various criteria, such as device type, OS, category, application, etc. To create and apply a client profile tag that selects the SSH application and the clients’ category, you need to do the following:

Navigate to Clients > Client Profile Tags on Aruba Central.

Click Add Tag and enter a name and description for the tag.

Click Add Rule and select Application as the attribute and SSH as the value.

Click Add Rule again and select Category as the attribute and IoT as the value.

Click Save to create the tag.

Navigate to Clients > Client List on Aruba Central.

Select the clients that you want to apply the tag to and click Assign Tag.

Select the tag that you created and click Apply.

After applying the tag, you can then filter the client list by the tag name and see a list of all the IoT clients that have used SSH. However, this method might not be as fast or accurate as using the Live Events monitoring tool, as it depends on how often the client profile tags are updated and synchronized with Aruba Central.

B. Run a search for SSH traffic and loT client IDs in Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager’s (CPPM’s) accounting information. This is not the fastest way to find a list of all the IoT clients that have used SSH because running a search in CPPM’s accounting information is a process that involves accessing another system and querying a large amount of data. Accounting information is a feature that allows CPPM to collect and store data about network sessions, such as start time, end time, duration, bytes sent/received, etc. To run a search for SSH traffic and IoT client IDs in CPPM’s accounting information, you need to do the following:

Log in to CPPM and navigate to Monitoring > Live Monitoring > Accounting.

Click on Advanced Search and enter SSH as the value for Service Name.

Click on Add Filter and enter IoT as the value for Endpoint Category.

Click on Search to run the query.

The query will then return a list of all the network sessions that involved SSH traffic and IoT clients. However, this method might not be as fast or convenient as using the Live Events monitoring tool, as it requires logging in to another system and searching through a large amount of data that might not be relevant or current.

D. Use Central’s Gateway IDS/IPS Security Dashboard to search for SSH events and sources. This is not a valid way to find a list of all the IoT clients that have used SSH because the Gateway IDS/IPS Security Dashboard is a feature that only applies to wired network devices connected to Aruba gateways, not wireless devices connected to Aruba APs. The Gateway IDS/IPS Security Dashboard is a feature that allows you to monitor and manage security events and alerts from your wired network devices on Aruba Central. You can use the Gateway IDS/IPS Security Dashboard to search for security events related to SSH, such as brute force attacks or unauthorized access attempts, but not for normal SSH traffic from wireless IoT devices. Therefore, this method will not help you find a list of all the IoT clients that have used SSH.

 This is because this URI specifies the exact attribute that contains the number of access rejects from the RADIUS server, which is the information that the NAE script needs to monitor and trigger an alert.

A. /rest/v1/system/vrfs/mgmt/radius/servers/cp.acnsxtest.local/2083/tcp?attributes=authstatistics. This is not the correct URI because it returns the entire authstatistics object, which contains more information than the access rejects, such as access accepts, challenges, timeouts, etc. This might make the NAE script more complex and inefficient to parse and process the data.

B. /rest/v1/system/vrfs/mgmt/radius/servers/cp.acnsxtest.local/2083/tcp?attributes=authstatistics?attributes=access_rejects. This is not a valid URI because it has two question marks, which is a syntax error. The question mark is used to indicate the start of the query string, which can have one or more parameters separated by ampersands. The correct way to specify multiple attributes is to use a comma-separated list after the question mark, such as ?attributes=attr1,attr2,attr3.

C. /rest/v1/system/vrfs/mgmt/radius/_servers/cp.acnsxtest.local/2083/tcp. This is not a valid URI because it has an extra underscore before servers, which is a typo. The correct resource name is servers, not _servers. Moreover, this URI does not specify any attributes, which means it will return the default attributes of the RADIUS server object, such as name, port, protocol, etc., but not the authstatistics or access_rejects.

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This is because network forensics relies on the analysis of network traffic data, which is often time-stamped by the devices that generate or transmit it. Having a synchronized and accurate clock across all network devices helps to establish a reliable timeline of events and correlate different sources of evidence12

A. Enable BPDU protection and loop protection on edge switch ports is not related to network security forensics, but rather to preventing network loops and topology changes caused by rogue switches or bridges3

B. Enabling debug-level information for network infrastructure device logs might provide more details about the network activity, but it also consumes more resources and storage, and might not be relevant or useful for forensic analysis. Moreover, debug-level information might not be available for long-term retention or legal purposes4

C. Implementing 802.1X authentication on switch ports that connect to APs is a good security practice to prevent unauthorized access to the network, but it does not directly help with network security forensics. 802.1X authentication does not capture or record network traffic data, which is the main source of evidence for network forensics

This is because SNMPv3 is a secure version of SNMP that provides authentication, encryption, and access control for network management. SNMPv3-only is a configuration option on AOS-CX switches that disables SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c, which are insecure versions of SNMP that use plain text community strings for authentication. By setting the snmp-server settings to “snmpv3-only”, the switch will only respond to SNMPv3 requests and reject any SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c requests, thus remedying the vulnerability and meeting the customer’s requirements.

A. Enabling control plane policing to automatically drop SNMP GET requests. This is not a valid recommendation because control plane policing is a feature that protects the switch from denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by limiting the rate of traffic sent to the CPU. Control plane policing does not disable SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c, but rather applies a rate limit to all SNMP requests, regardless of the version. Moreover, control plane policing might also drop legitimate SNMP requests if they exceed the rate limit, which could affect the network management.

C. Adding an SNMP community with a long random name. This is not a valid recommendation because an SNMP community is a shared secret that acts as a password for accessing network devices using SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c. Adding an SNMP community with a long random name does not disable SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c, but rather creates another community string that can be used for authentication. Moreover, adding an SNMP community with a long random name does not improve the security of SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c, as the community string is still transmitted in plain text and can be intercepted by an attacker.

D. Enabling SNMPv3, which implicitly disables SNMPv1/v2. This is not a valid recommendation because enabling SNMPv3 does not implicitly disable SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c on AOS-CX switches. Enabling SNMPv3 only adds support for the secure version of SNMP, but does not remove support for the insecure versions. Therefore, enabling SNMPv3 alone does not remedy the vulnerability or meet the customer’s requirements.

According to the Aruba Cloud Authentication and Policy Overview1, one of the prerequisites for configuring Cloud Authentication and Policy is to configure Device Insight (client profile) tags in Central. Device Insight tags are used to identify and classify IoT devices based on their behavior and characteristics. These tags can then be mapped to client roles, which are defined in the WLAN configuration for IAPs2. Client roles are used to enforce role-based access policies for the IoT devices. Therefore, option B is the correct answer.

Option A is incorrect because NetConductor is not related to Cloud Authentication and Policy. NetConductor is a cloud-based network management solution that simplifies the deployment and operation of Aruba Instant networks.

Option C is incorrect because integrating Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) and Device Insight is not a prerequisite for setting up the device role mappings. CPPM and Device Insight can work together to provide enhanced visibility and control over IoT devices, but they are not required for Cloud Authentication and Policy.

Option D is incorrect because creating global role-to-role firewall policies in Central is not a prerequisite for setting up the device role mappings. Global role-to-role firewall policies are used to define the traffic rules between different client roles across the entire network, but they are not required for Cloud Authentication and Policy.

A profile conflict occurs when ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) detects a change in the device category or OS family of an endpoint that has been previously profiled. This could indicate that someone has spoofed the MAC address of a legitimate device and is trying to gain unauthorized access to the network. For example, if an endpoint that was previously profiled as a Printer suddenly shows a new profile of Computer, this could be a sign of an attack. You can find more information about profile conflicts and how to resolve them in the ClearPass Policy Manager User Guide1. The other options are not necessarily signs of unauthorized access, as they could have other explanations. For example, multiple DHCP options under the fingerprints could indicate that the device has connected to different networks or subnets, an Unknown status could indicate that the device has not been authenticated yet, and a lack of hostname or a random hostname could indicate that the device has not been configured properly or has been reset to factory settings.

This is because ARP inspection is a security feature that validates ARP packets in a network and prevents ARP poisoning attacks12 ARP inspection works by intercepting, logging, and discarding ARP packets with invalid IP-to-MAC address bindings1 To enable ARP inspection, the switch needs to know which ports are trusted and which are untrusted. Trusted ports are those that connect to authorized DHCP servers or other network devices that are not vulnerable to ARP spoofing. Untrusted ports are those that connect to end hosts or devices that might send forged ARP packets13

In the exhibit, LAG 1 is configured as a trusted port for ARP inspection, which is correct because it connects to the core switch. However, the edge ports (1/1/1-1/1/24) are not configured as untrusted ports for ARP inspection, which is incorrect because they connect to end hosts that might be compromised by an attacker. By default, all ports are untrusted for ARP inspection, but this can be changed by using the command ip arp inspection trust on the interface configuration mode3 Therefore, to protect VLAN 4 against ARP poisoning, the edge ports should be configured as untrusted for ARP inspection by using the command no ip arp inspection trust on the interface configuration mode. This way, the switch will validate the ARP packets received on these ports against the DHCP snooping database or an ARP access-list and drop any invalid packets34

A. ARP proxy is not enabled on VLAN 4. This is not an issue because ARP proxy is an optional feature that allows the switch to respond to ARP requests on behalf of hosts in different subnets5 It is not related to ARP poisoning or ARP inspection.

B. LAG 1 is configured as trusted for ARP inspection but should be untrusted. This is not an issue because LAG 1 connects to the core switch, which is a trusted device that does not send forged ARP packets.

C. DHCP snooping is not enabled on VLAN 4. This is not an issue because DHCP snooping is a separate feature that prevents rogue DHCP servers from offering IP addresses to clients6 It is not directly related to ARP poisoning or ARP inspection, although it can provide information for ARP inspection validation if enabled