CEDP IBFCSM Certified Emergency and Disaster Professional Free Practice Exam Questions (2026 Updated)

TheCenters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in collaboration with the American Water Works Association (AWWA), is the primary agency that publishes technical guidelines for hospital emergency water management.1Their seminal document, theEmergency Water Supply Planning Guide for Hospitals and Healthcare Facilities, provides a comprehensive roadmap for healthcare institutions to prepare for and respond to water supply interruptions.2

While CMS (Option C) mandates that hospitals have an emergency preparedness plan to maintain accreditation, they do not provide the granular technical guidance found in the CDC materials. The CDC guidelines focus on the public health implications of water loss, emphasizing the "four-step process" for developing an Emergency Water Supply Plan (EWSP): performing a water use audit, analyzing alternatives, developing the plan, and exercising it. These guidelines help hospitals calculate the minimum amount of water needed for patient care, sanitation, HVAC (chillers), and laundry during a crisis.

For the CEDP professional, the CDC’s water management guidelines are critical because a hospital cannot function without water for more than a few hours. The guidance includes specific advice on "Short-term" versus "Long-term" alternatives, such as using municipal backup lines, private wells, or tankered water. It also details the chemical and microbiological monitoring required when transitioning between water sources to prevent outbreaks of waterborne illnesses likeLegionella. By following CDC standards, disaster professionals ensure that even when the municipal grid fails, the clinical and life-support systems of the facility remain safe for patients and staff.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations are divided into different "Parts" based on the industry type.29 CFR 1910contains theGeneral Industry Standards, which are the primary rules governing the safety of the majority of disaster workers, including those in healthcare, manufacturing, and general emergency response. While other parts may apply—such as 29 CFR 1926 for construction workers involved in debris removal or rebuilding—1910 is the "foundation" for occupational safety in the United States.

Within 29 CFR 1910, several specific subparts are critical for disaster professionals:

1910.120 (HAZWOPER):Governs the safety of workers responding to hazardous substance releases.

1910.134 (Respiratory Protection):Mandates fit testing and medical evaluations for workers using respirators.10

1910.38 (Emergency Action Plans):Requires employers to have written plans for evacuation and fire safety.11

1910.1030 (Bloodborne Pathogens):Protects responders from exposure to infectious materials.

Option A (1904) refers specifically to theRecording and Reporting of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, and Option C (1926) refers toConstruction. For theCEDPcandidate, 1910 is the "bible" of workplace safety. OSHA’s "General Duty Clause" (Section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act) also mandates that even if a specific disaster-related hazard isn't mentioned in a standard, the employer must still provide a place of employment that is free from recognized hazards. During a disaster, OSHA often transitions to a "Technical Assistance" role, helping incident commanders identify risks to their personnel, but the underlying legal requirement to follow the 1910 standards remains in effect to ensure that the responders do not become victims themselves.

The concept ofVertical Integrationrefers to the "meshing" or synchronization of emergency plans and actions across the different levels of government—from the local level up to the state, and finally to the federal level. According toFEMA's CPG 101, vertical integration is based on the principle ofTiered Response, which recognizes that all disasters start locally and only scale up when local resources are exceeded. For this system to work, the local Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) must be compatible with the State EOP, which must in turn be compatible with the National Response Framework (NRF).

Vertical integration ensures that there is a "Common Operational Focus" regardless of which level of government is providing the resources. For example, if a local plan uses theIncident Command System (ICS)and specificResource Typing, the state and federal levels must use those same standards to ensure that their support "meshes" with the local activities. This prevents jurisdictional conflict and ensures that state and federal assets can be "plugged in" to the local incident structure seamlessly.

In contrast,Horizontal Integration(Option A) refers to the coordination between different agencies or departments at thesamelevel of government (e.g., the local fire department planning with the local police department).Modular planning(Option C) refers to the technical ability of a plan to expand or contract based on incident size, but it does not describe the inter-governmental relationship. For aCEDPprofessional, achieving vertical integration is one of the most difficult but essential tasks of thePreparedness Phase. It requires constant communication and "co-planning" with higher-level jurisdictions to ensure that when the "big one" hits, the community is not isolated, but is instead the foundation of a vertically integrated national response system that can rapidly surge resources to the point of need.

TheHomeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)is built on aCapability-basedplanning philosophy. This approach shifts the focus from preparing for specific scenarios (like "Hurricane Katrina") to building a set ofCore Capabilitiesthat are applicable across any disaster type. This ensures that a community is prepared for "all hazards" by possessing the essential tools, skills, and resources needed to respond to any event.

Under theNational Preparedness Goal, FEMA identifies 32 Core Capabilities, such as "Operational Communications," "Mass Care Services," and "Public Information and Warning." The HSEEP philosophy mandates that exercises are designed to test these specific capabilities. For example, rather than just running a "fire drill," a capability-based exercise would specifically evaluate the "Search and Rescue" and "Fire Management" capabilities. If an exercise identifies a gap in "On-Scene Security," the jurisdiction then knows exactly where to direct its funding and training.

This differs from a "Function" philosophy (Option A), which is more about the internal organizational structure (like the ICS sections), and a "Response" philosophy (Option B), which is purely reactive. Capability-based planning is proactive and measurable. For theCEDPprofessional, HSEEP provides the standardized methodology to "measure" readiness. By using Capability-based planning, emergency managers can justify grant requests by demonstrating that they are building a specific, federally recognized capability that is currently missing or deficient in their community.

In the development of aHazard Mitigation Plan (HMP), the "locus" or central focus must always be on long-term risk reduction and life safety, rather thanshort-range and political goals. According to theDisaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000)and FEMA'sLocal Mitigation Planning Handbook, effective planning requires looking beyond the immediate political cycle or temporary local interests.

If a mitigation plan is driven by political goals (Option C), it may prioritize "visible" but less effective projects over technically sound infrastructure improvements. For example, a local politician might push for a new park in a floodplain because it is popular, rather than funding a less visible but more critical drainage system upgrade. This compromises the community’s resilience by ignoring the scientific data provided during theHazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA)process.

Options A and B are, conversely, essential parts of a legitimate planning process. Assessing local threats (Option A) is the scientific foundation of the plan, and evaluating budget capacity (Option B) ensures that the plan is realistic and implementable. A plan that cannot be funded is merely a "wish list." However, theCEDPprofessional is taught that mitigation is a long-term investment. Political goals are inherently transient, whereas the hazards—such as seismic activity or climate-driven flooding—are persistent and require sustained, non-partisan commitment. Aligning mitigation with long-term land-use planning and building codes, rather than short-term political wins, ensures that federal grant eligibility is maintained and that the community is genuinely safer for future generations.

In the timeline of a disaster, response efforts officially begin at the moment ofIncident recognition. This is the point where an individual or agency identifies that an emergency situation exists that requires action. While anOfficial declaration(Option A)—such as a local, state, or federal disaster declaration—is critical for unlocking funding and legal authorities, it often happens hours or even days after the initial response has already begun. First responders (Fire, Police, EMS) are typically on the scene and performing life-saving actions based solely on the recognition of the hazard.

Mitigation completion (Option B) refers to the end of long-term projects designed to reduce risk (like building a levee), which occurs well before an incident starts. According to NIMS (National Incident Management System), the response phase includes all immediate actions to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs. This phase starts the second a 911 dispatcher receives a call or an automated sensor detects a breach, and it continues until the incident is stabilized.

For a CEDP professional, the distinction between "Recognition" and "Declaration" is important for operational speed. If a team waited for an official declaration before acting, many more lives would be lost. Incident recognition triggers the Initial Response phase, which includes the establishment of Incident Command, the size-up of the situation, and the deployment of initial resources. The "Official Declaration" is a secondary administrative step that supports the ongoing response and recovery but is not the "trigger" for the very first responder activities on the ground.

TheMobile Emergency Response Support (MERS)detachments are specialized, rapid-response teams operated and maintained by theFederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).2These detachments provide mobile telecommunications, operational support, logistics, and power generation to state, local, and federal responders during disasters or incidents of national significance.3MERS is essentially FEMA's "first-in" tactical support capability, ensuring that an Incident Command Post (ICP) or Joint Field Office (JFO) can function even when the local commercial infrastructure has been completely destroyed.

There are currently five MERS detachments strategically located across the United States (Bothell, WA; Denver, CO; Denton, TX; Frederick, MD; and Maynard, MA). Each detachment is equipped with a fleet of vehicles including Multi-Radio Vans, Satellite Power Generation trucks, and Heating/Air Conditioning units. Their primary mission is to establish a "communications bridge" using satellite, high-frequency radio, and cellular-over-IP technologies. This ensures that theCommon Operating Picture (COP)can be transmitted back to the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) and the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC).

For aCEDPprofessional, knowing the capabilities of MERS is vital for catastrophic planning. If a hurricane or earthquake wipes out all local cell towers and fiber optic lines, the arrival of a MERS detachment provides the "nerve center" required for organized rescue efforts. While the Department of Defense (Option C) has similar capabilities, they are used for military missions or via specific "Defense Support of Civil Authorities" (DSCA) requests. FEMA's MERS is the dedicated civilian asset designed specifically to support theNational Response Frameworkand ensure that the command and control structure remains resilient in the most austere environments.4

In the methodology of plan synchronization, particularly within theFederal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs)andCPG 101, the primary dimensions used to synchronize resources and actions areTimeandSpace. Synchronization is the process of arranging actions to occur at a specific time and in a specific location to achieve the most effective results. For example, in a hurricane response, synchronization ensures that search and rescue teams (Space) arrive immediately after the storm passes (Time), followed closely by mass care and power restoration assets.

Time(Option B) is a critical synchronization factor because emergency managers must understand the sequence of events and the duration of tasks to prevent bottlenecks.Space(Option C) is equally vital, as it involves the geographic allocation of resources to ensure they are positioned where the need is greatest without causing congestion or interfering with other operations.

Resolution(Option A), while a technical term often used in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) or data analysis to describe the level of detail in a map or image, contributes very little to the actual synchronization of operational actions. High resolution might help inidentifyinga hazard, but it does not dictate the coordination of when and where multiple agencies move their "boots on the ground." In the context of theCEDPcurriculum, plan synchronization is about the "harmonization of effort." It focuses on the "when" and "where" of the response.

A plan that is not synchronized in time and space leads to "freelancing" and a waste of the "Golden Hour" of life-saving. Therefore, while resolution is important for theInformation Managementphase to provide a clear picture, it is not a core dimension of the synchronization process itself. Effective synchronization ensures that the "Tail" (logistics) follows the "Teeth" (operations) in a logical, geographic, and temporal flow that maximizes the efficiency of the entireIncident Command Systemstructure.

To ensure that resources are aligned across all levels of government and with the private sector, agencies look to theFederal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs). While the National Planning Frameworks (like the NRF) provide the "Doctrine" or "What" of the response, the FIOPs provide the "How." There is a specific FIOP for each of the five mission areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. These plans provide a detailed concept of operations, specify critical tasks, and—most importantly—identify the resourcing and sourcing requirementsfor delivering the 32 Core Capabilities.

For example, theResponse FIOPdescribes how the federal government integrates its efforts to support local and state authorities. It aligns the resources of the 15Emergency Support Functions (ESFs)with the specific capabilities needed on the ground, such as "Mass Care Services" or "Operational Communications." By obtaining guidance from these plans, a local or state agency can understand what federal assets are available, how they are "typed," and the specific "triggers" for their deployment. This prevents the "duplication of efforts" and ensures that federal support is additive rather than disruptive to the local response.

According to theNational Planning System, alignment is achieved through the vertical and horizontal integration of plans. Options A and B are valuable components of a preparedness program—technical assistance helps build skills, and remedial action (lessons learned) helps fix errors—but theFIOPsare the primary documents used to synchronize the actualdeliveryof capabilities during a large-scale event. For aCEDPprofessional, the FIOPs serve as the "Interface Manual" between different government layers. They ensure that when a capability is needed, the resources are not just "present," but are organized into a coherent structure that follows the principles of NIMS, ensuring a unified effort across the whole community.

TheGround Fault Circuit Interrupter (GFCI)is a life-safety device specifically designed to protect people from electrical shock. According toOSHA 29 CFR 1910.304, a GFCI works by constantly monitoring the current flowing through a circuit. It compares the amount of current going to an electrical component with the amount returning from it. In a normally functioning circuit, these two values should be nearly identical. However, if the GFCI detects a difference as small as 4 to 6 milliamperes—indicating that some of the current is "leaking" out of the circuit through an unintended path, such as a human body touching a conductive surface—it will break the circuit in as little as 1/30th of a second.

It is essential for disaster professionals to distinguish a GFCI from a standardCircuit Breaker(Option C). A circuit breaker is designed to protectequipment and the building structurefrom fires caused by overloads or short circuits; it typically only trips when the current exceeds 15 or 20 amperes. This level of current is far above the "let-go" threshold for humans and can be fatal. A GFCI, by contrast, is a "personnel protection" device.Voltage interrupters(Option A) is a generic term that does not refer to this specific safety technology.

In disaster management, GFCIs are mandatory for all temporary power setups, particularly in wet or damp environments common after floods or storms. Under theNational Electrical Code (NEC)andNFPA 70E, GFCIs must be used with portable generators and power tools on-site. TheCEDPcurriculum emphasizes that "stray voltage" is a major hazard in disaster zones. By ensuring all power sources are GFCI-protected, emergency managers mitigate the risk of accidental electrocution for both responders and victims who may be navigating flooded structures or using emergency power systems.

Under theNational Preparedness Goal,Forensics and Attributionis identified as a specific core capability within thePreventionmission area. The Prevention mission area focuses on the capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent, or stop an imminent, threatened, or actual act of terrorism. Forensic analysis in this context is used to identify the perpetrators of a threat, determine the origin of a hazardous agent (such as a biological or chemical weapon), and provide the evidence necessary to interdict a plot before it can be executed.

While forensic techniques are also used during theResponsephase (to identify victims in mass fatality incidents) or theRecoveryphase (to understand the root causes of an engineering failure), the federal government explicitly places "Forensics and Attribution" under Prevention because of its role in national security. By analyzing technical data and physical evidence, intelligence and law enforcement agencies can "attribute" a threat to a specific state or non-state actor. This attribution is a powerful deterrent and a prerequisite for preventing future attacks.

For aCertified Emergency and Disaster Professional (CEDP), understanding the role of forensics within the Prevention mission area is critical forPublic-Private Partnership. Many private sector entities (such as chemical plants or cybersecurity firms) are "sensors" that provide the raw data used in forensic analysis. By cooperating with federal entities like the FBI or the National Counterproliferation Center, local emergency managers help build the national "Prevention" shield. This capability ensures that the homeland security enterprise can not only react to disasters but can also proactively disrupt the plans of those who intend to cause harm, fulfilling the first and most vital mission of protecting the public.

For the centralUS Pacific Coast(California, Oregon, and Washington), aHurricaneis considered extremely unlikely. Unlike the Atlantic or Gulf Coasts, the Pacific Coast is protected by two primary physical factors:Cold Ocean TemperaturesandPrevailing Wind Patterns. Hurricanes require warm ocean water (typically above 80°F) to maintain their strength. The California Current brings cold water from the North Pacific down the coast, which acts as a "chilled barrier" that causes tropical cyclones to dissipate rapidly if they move northward from the Mexican coast.

In contrast,Tsunamis(Option A) are a significant threat due to the region's proximity to theCascadia Subduction Zoneand the "Ring of Fire." A seismic event in the Pacific can send devastating waves to the central coast within hours (distant) or minutes (local).Wildfires(Option C) are an annual reality in this region, driven by seasonal droughts, high temperatures, and "Santa Ana" or "Diablo" wind conditions.

For aCertified Emergency and Disaster Professional (CEDP), recognizing these regional hazard profiles is essential for theHazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA)process. Planning for a hurricane in San Francisco would be an inefficient use of resources, whereas planning for "Post-Tropical Depressions" (which bring heavy rain) or "Atmospheric Rivers" is critical. While the West Coast can experience "Hurricane-force winds" during severe winter storms, these are technicallyExtratropical Cyclones, not hurricanes. Understanding the meteorology behind these distinctions ensures that the Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) and the public warning systems are calibrated to the actual threats faced by the community, rather than generic disaster scenarios.

In the traditional hierarchy of emergency management and the Incident Command System (ICS), the model of authority is described asVertical. This refers to a "Top-Down" command structure where decisions flow from the Incident Commander (at the top) down to the operational personnel. This verticality ensures a clearChain of Command, which is essential for maintaining order, accountability, and safety during the high-stress environment of a disaster response.

The vertical model is designed to prevent "management by committee," which can be slow and indecisive. In a life-safety situation, a single individual (the Incident Commander) must have the ultimate authority to make rapid decisions. This structure is reinforced by the principle ofUnity of Command, which dictates that every individual in the organization reports to exactly one supervisor. This vertical reporting relationship ensures that instructions are not conflicting and that every responder knows exactly where they fit within the organizational chart.

While modern emergency management often involves "Coordinated" (Option A) efforts between multiple agencies (throughUnified Command), the authoritywithineach agency or within the integrated ICS structure remains strictly vertical. Even in a Unified Command scenario, where leaders from different jurisdictions work together to develop a single set of objectives, those objectives are carried out through a vertical chain of subordinates. An "Inclusive" (Option B) model is often used in theplanningormitigationphases to gather diverse stakeholder input, but it is not the "model of authority" used during active incident operations. For aCEDPprofessional, understanding the vertical nature of authority is critical for ensuring that the organization can scale up or down (modularly) while maintaining a strict and reliable flow of information and orders from the command level to the tactical field units.

TheNational Incident Management System (NIMS)emphasizes the importance of aCommon Operating Picture (COP)primarily to enhance operational efficiency and resource management.4A COP is a continuously updated overview of an incident that is shared across different agencies and jurisdictions. By maintaining an accurate operating picture, all decision-makers and field personnel are looking at the same data regarding resource locations, incident boundaries, and hazard zones.5This shared situational awareness is the most effective tool tohelp emergency responders and other personnel avoid the duplication of efforts.

When multiple agencies (fire, police, EMS, and public works) respond to a large-scale disaster, there is a high risk of "independent action" or "freelancing," where different teams perform the same task (e.g., searching the same building twice) while other critical needs go unmet.6NIMS communication standards mandate that information flow through a disciplined structure so that the Incident Command can de-conflict activities. While consistency among senior commanders (Option A) and accurate media releases (Option C) are important secondary benefits of a COP, they are not the primary operational driver.

The core objective is "unity of effort." According toFEMA’s NIMS Doctrine, effective information management allows the Incident Commander to maximize the impact of limited resources. For aCEDPprofessional, establishing a COP involves the integration of GIS mapping, status boards, and interoperable radio systems. When every responder knows what has been done and what is currently being addressed, the safety of the personnel increases because the risk of "friendly fire" or logistical bottlenecks is significantly reduced. This systematic approach ensures that the response is lean, fast, and coordinated, directly reflecting the NIMS principle of "Management by Objectives."

Community resilience is defined by theNational Academy of SciencesandFEMAas the ability of a community to prepare for anticipated hazards, adapt to changing conditions, and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. While mitigation effectiveness (Option B) measures how well specific projects reduced physical damage, the true metric of a resilient community is thelength of recovery time. A resilient system is one that experiences a smaller "dip" in functionality and returns to its "steady state" or a "new normal" more quickly than a non-resilient one.

The assessment of recovery time involves measuring how long it takes forCommunity Lifelines—such as power, water, communications, and health services—to be restored to the impacted population. According to theNational Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), recovery is a sequence of short-term, intermediate, and long-term milestones. A community with high resilience will have pre-established contingencies and social capital that allow for "expedient recovery." For example, if two cities are hit by the same magnitude earthquake, the city that has its businesses open and its residents back in their homes within six months is objectively more resilient than the city still operating out of tents after two years.

For aCertified Emergency and Disaster Professional (CEDP), assessing resilience through recovery time provides a holistic view of the community's health. It encompasses not just the physical infrastructure, but also the economic stability and social cohesion. If the length of recovery is prolonged, it indicates a failure in thePreparednessorMitigationphases, such as a lack of insurance coverage, poor building codes, or inadequate business continuity planning. By focusing on recovery time as the primary KPI (Key Performance Indicator), emergency managers can identify specific bottlenecks in the recovery process—such as permitting delays or supply chain gaps—and target those areas for future resilience investments, ensuring that the community becomes progressively more robust with each subsequent event.

In the context of theChemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)and theEPA’s Risk Management Program (RMP), the primary mechanism the government uses to ensure national chemical security isRegulation. While coordination (Option B) and collaboration (Option C) are essential for a smooth response, the security of high-risk chemical facilities is enforced through a strictly regulated legal framework that mandates specific security performance standards.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) utilizes the CFATS program to identify and regulate high-risk chemical facilities.9Facilities that possess "Chemicals of Interest" (COI) at or above specific quantities must complete a Top-Screen assessment. Based on the risk level, they are assigned a "Tier" (1 through 4) and are required to develop aSite Security Plan (SSP)or an Alternative Security Program (ASP) that meets 18Risk-Based Performance Standards (RBPS). These standards include physical security, background checks, and cyber-security.

According to theCEDPcurriculum, regulation is what provides the "teeth" for national security in the private sector. Unlike voluntary programs, regulatory compliance is mandatory and subject to government inspections and fines. This ensures a consistent "baseline" of security across the country, preventing "weak links" in the chemical supply chain that could be exploited by terrorists. By usingRegulation(such as 6 CFR Part 27), the government compels facility owners to invest in the necessary physical and procedural barriers that protect the community from a catastrophic chemical release, thereby maintaining both security and national resilience.

U.S. disaster management, as codified in theNational Incident Management System (NIMS)and theIncident Command System (ICS), adheres to aVerticalauthority model. This model is defined by a clearChain of Commandand a top-down reporting structure. In every incident, there is a singleIncident Commander (IC)(or a Unified Command group acting as one) at the top of the hierarchy. Orders, objectives, and strategic priorities flow vertically downward from the IC through Section Chiefs to tactical personnel in the field.

The vertical model is essential forAccountabilityandUnity of Command. It ensures that every individual involved in the response reports to exactly one supervisor, preventing the confusion of conflicting orders that often occurs in "coordinated" but non-hierarchical (Option A) or overly "bureaucratic" (Option C) systems. While the response involves thecoordinationof many agencies, theauthorityto make life-safety decisions remains vertical to ensure speed and efficiency. As an incident grows, the structure expands modularly, adding layers of supervision (Branches, Divisions, Groups) to maintain a manageableSpan of Control, but the vertical integrity of the command remains intact.

According to theCEDPcurriculum, this verticality is what allows for "Interoperability." Because every jurisdiction in the U.S. uses this same vertical ICS model, a firefighter from California can report into a vertical structure in Florida and immediately understand who they work for and who is in charge of the scene. This "Paramilitary" structure is the proven method for managing high-consequence, high-velocity events where decentralized or horizontal decision-making would lead to delays and increased risk to life.

While public health and medical preparedness are shared responsibilities, the specificPublic Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Capabilitiesare developed and coordinated by theCenters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC established the "15 Public Health Preparedness Capabilities" as the national standard for state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) health departments to use in their planning and to justify federal grant funding.

The 15 PHEP capabilities include:

Community Preparedness

Community Recovery

Emergency Operations Coordination

Emergency Public Information and Warning

Fatality Management

Information Sharing

Mass Care

Medical Countermeasure Dispensing and Administration

Medical Materiel Management and Distribution

Medical Surge

Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions

Public Health Surveillance and Epidemiological Investigation

Public Health Laboratory Testing

Responder Safety and Health

Volunteer Management

In contrast,ASPR(Option A) coordinates the "Healthcare Preparedness Capabilities," which focus on hospitals and healthcare coalitions. The CDC’s focus is broader, addressing the underlying public health infrastructure, such as laboratory testing (Capability 13) and epidemiological investigation (Capability 12). For aCEDPprofessional, the CDC’s standards are the "baseline" for community health resilience. When a health department is awarded PHEP funding, they are held accountable for demonstrating their ability to perform these specific functions. This ensures that the nation’s public health system is not just reactive to diseases, but is a robust, capability-based shield capable of managing the health impacts of any hazard, from a natural disaster to a biological attack.

Under theIncident Command System (ICS)as standardized byNIMS, the development of theMedical Plan (ICS Form 206)is the responsibility of theLogistics Section, specifically theMedical Unit Leader. The Medical Plan provides information on incident medical aid stations, transportation (ambulances), hospitals, and procedures for responding to responder injuries or medical emergencies within the incident management team itself.

It is a common point of confusion to think theSafety Officer(Option C) develops the Medical Plan. While the Safety Officer is responsible for overall incident safety and develops theIncident Safety Analysis (ICS 215A), the actual logistics of providing medical care to personnel falls under the Logistics Section. TheOperations Officer(Option B) manages the "tactical" medical response (e.g., treating disaster victims), but the internal "NIMS Medical Plan" for the responders is a support function handled by Logistics.

In theCEDPbody of knowledge, this highlights the "Support" vs. "Tactical" distinction. The Logistics Section is responsible for the "Service Branch," which includes the Medical Unit, the Food Unit, and the Communications Unit. The Medical Unit Leader must coordinate with the Safety Officer to ensure the plan covers all identified hazards, but the administrative creation and management of the ICS 206 form remain within the Logistics chain of command. This ensures that the Incident Commander knows exactly how their "troops" will be cared for if they are injured during the performance of their duties, maintaining the integrity and health of the response force throughout the operational period.