ISA-IEC-62443 ISA/IEC 62443 Cybersecurity Fundamentals Specialist Free Practice Exam Questions (2026 Updated)

A Local Area Network (LAN) is not a strategy for deploying a Wide Area Network (WAN). WAN deployment strategies include using the public Internet, private enterprise WANs, or carrier-managed WANs. LANs, by definition, serve local, not wide-area, connectivity. ISA/IEC 62443 standards refer to different strategies for extending network communications over broader geographic regions, but do not classify LAN as a WAN deployment option.

ISA/IEC 62443-2-1 defines SP Element 1 – Organizational Security Measures as the set of governance, policy, and people-focused controls that establish the foundation of an IACS Security Program. These measures are organizational in nature and are intended to create accountability, awareness, and structured risk management.

Step 1: Scope of SP Element 1

SP Element 1 includes activities such as:

Security policy definition

Roles and responsibilities

Personnel security (e.g., background checks)

Security awareness and training

Supply chain security governance

These controls ensure that people, processes, and third-party relationships support cybersecurity objectives.

Step 2: Why malware protection does not belong here

Malware protection is a technical control, not an organizational measure. In ISA/IEC 62443, malware protection is addressed under SP Element 4 – Component Hardening, which focuses on endpoint protection, anti-malware mechanisms, and secure configurations.

Step 3: Why the other options are valid

Background checks are explicitly part of personnel security.

Supply chain security is a key organizational concern.

Security awareness training ensures staff understand their responsibilities.

Therefore, Malware protection is not listed under SP Element 1.

The ISA/IEC 62443 series is structured into logical groups to address different aspects of industrial cybersecurity. Historically, the series was organized into Parts 1 through 4, covering general concepts, management system requirements, system requirements, and component requirements. As the standard evolved, the need arose to address sector-specific and application-specific cybersecurity needs without modifying the core requirements.

To address this, ISA introduced the concept of cybersecurity profiles. These profiles allow industries (such as oil and gas, power, water, or manufacturing) to select and tailor existing ISA/IEC 62443 requirements for their specific operational context while preserving consistency with the base standard.

The Profiles Group is formally designated as ISA/IEC 62443-5-x. This numbering clearly distinguishes profiles from foundational requirements and ensures that:

No new security requirements are created

Existing requirements are selected, scoped, and referenced appropriately

Alignment with Parts 2, 3, and 4 is preserved

By allocating profiles to the 5-x series, ISA ensures modularity and prevents fragmentation of the standard. Profiles serve as an application layer over existing requirements, enabling consistent adoption across sectors without redefining core security controls.

Parts 3-x and 4-x remain dedicated to system and component requirements, while 6-x does not exist in the published structure for profiles. Therefore, 5-x is the correct and formally defined answer.

A National Standardization Body (NSB) represents a country's interests in international standards organizations like ISO or IEC, and is responsible for adopting and promoting these standards at the national level.

“A National Standardization Body (NSB) participates in the development of international standards, represents national interests, and facilitates the adoption of international standards as national standards.”

— ISA/IEC 62443-1-1:2007 – Definitions and Governance Roles

In contrast:

A Global SDO (Standards Development Organization) works at the international level

A Regulatory Agency enforces rules

An Industry Consortium is a private collaboration, not a national entity

 According to the IEC 62443 standard, a capability security level (SL-C) is defined as “the security level that a component or system is capable of meeting when it is properly configured and protected by an appropriate set of security countermeasures” 1. A component or system can have different SL-Cs for different security requirements, depending on its design and implementation. The SL-C is determined by testing the component or system against a set of security test cases that correspond to the security requirements. The SL-C is not dependent on the actual operational environment or configuration of the component or system, but rather on its inherent capabilities. References:

IEC 62443 - Wikipedia

ISA/IEC 62443-2-1 requires objective, verifiable evidence of cybersecurity controls during audits and assessments.

Step 1: Evidence-based verification

Auditors assess whether required processes and technical controls are implemented and effective. Documentation such as configurations, procedures, logs, and policies provides verifiable proof.

Step 2: Why documentation matters

Written records demonstrate consistency, repeatability, and governance—key goals of the standard.

Step 3: Why other options fail

Financial spending does not prove control effectiveness. Anecdotes are subjective. Marketing materials are not evidence.

Thus, documentation verifying use and configuration of technologies is the correct evidence.

The Security Program (SP) portfolio is the correct foundational document for an evolving IACS cybersecurity approach according to the ISA/IEC 62443 family of standards. ISA/IEC 62443 is explicitly designed around the concept of continuous risk management and lifecycle-based cybersecurity, rather than static or one-time security implementations.

Step 1: Role of the Security Program (SP)

ISA/IEC 62443-2-1 defines the requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining, and continuously improving an IACS Cybersecurity Management System. The Security Program provides organizational governance through policies, roles, responsibilities, procedures, training, incident handling, change management, and continuous improvement activities. These elements ensure cybersecurity adapts as threats, vulnerabilities, and system configurations evolve.

Step 2: Need for an evolving security approach

The standard recognizes that IACS environments are long-lived and subject to changing operational conditions, emerging threat actors, and new vulnerabilities. Therefore, cybersecurity must be managed as an ongoing process. The SP portfolio enables periodic reassessment of risks, updates to controls, and improvements to security processes throughout the system lifecycle.

Step 3: Relationship between SP and SPS

IEC 62443-2-2 introduces the Security Protection Scheme (SPS), which is a documented set of technical, procedural, and physical security measures selected to mitigate identified risks. However, the SPS is not the foundation; it is a product of the Security Program. The SP governs how the SPS is developed, implemented, operated, and modified over time.

Step 4: Elimination of incorrect options

“IEC 62443-2-2 only” is insufficient because it addresses SPS development without broader governance.

Corporate KPIs unrelated to IACS do not manage cybersecurity risk.

An SPS alone cannot evolve without programmatic oversight.

In alignment with the intent and structure of ISA/IEC 62443, the Security Program (SP) portfolio is the correct foundation for a cybersecurity plan that must continuously evolve.

A security policy refers to internal rules that govern how an organization protects critical system resources, such as industrial control systems (ICS). A security policy defines the objectives, scope, roles, responsibilities, and requirements for securing the ICS environment, as well as the procedures and guidelines for implementing, monitoring, and enforcing the security measures. A security policy also establishes the baseline for assessing and managing the security risks to the ICS, and for ensuring compliance with relevant standards, regulations, and best practices. A security policy is a key component of the ICS security program, and it should be documented, communicated, and reviewed regularly.

The other choices are not correct because:

A. Formal guidance. Formal guidance refers to external sources of information and recommendations that can help an organization improve its ICS security posture, such as standards, frameworks, guidelines, and best practices. Formal guidance is not an internal rule, but rather a reference that can be used to develop, implement, and evaluate the security policy and controls. For example, the ISA/IEC 62443 series of standards provide formal guidance on how to secure ICS from cyber threats1.

B. Legislation. Legislation refers to external laws and regulations that impose legal obligations and penalties on an organization for its ICS security performance, such as the NERC CIP standards for the electric sector2, or the EU NIS Directive for critical infrastructure operators3. Legislation is not an internal rule, but rather a compliance requirement that must be met by the organization. Legislation may also influence the security policy and controls, as the organization needs to align its security objectives and practices with the legal expectations and consequences.

D. Code of conduct. A code of conduct refers to a set of ethical principles and values that guide the behavior and decision-making of an organization and its employees, such as honesty, integrity, respect, and accountability. A code of conduct is not an internal rule for protecting critical system resources, but rather a general norm for conducting business and maintaining a positive reputation. A code of conduct may also support the security policy and culture, as it can foster a sense of responsibility and trust among the ICS stakeholders.

The asset model is used in ISA/IEC 62443 to represent and describe the relationships and dependencies between different assets in an IACS environment. This model helps organizations identify and document assets, their interconnections, and their significance for operational and cybersecurity purposes. The zone model builds upon the asset model for segmentation, but the asset model itself establishes the foundational relationships.

In ANSI/ISA-99.00.01:2007, which is part of the ISA/IEC 62443 standards, electronic security encompasses both the technical and human aspects of cybersecurity within industrial automated and control systems (IACS). Option B correctly highlights components such as computers, networks, operating systems, applications, and other programmable configurable components which are intrinsic to the system's electronic security framework. Option C is also correct as it includes the personnel, policies, and procedures which play a crucial role in securing these systems. This emphasizes that security is not only about the technological solutions but also about managing human elements and organizational processes effectively.

ISA/IEC 62443 Cybersecurity Fundamentals References:

ISA/IEC 62443 standards focus on the holistic nature of security which is clearly supported by including both the technological (Option B) and human elements (Option C) in the definition of electronic security.

System availability is a core objective of ISA/IEC 62443, reflected in the Resource Availability (RA) foundational requirement. When frequent shutdowns occur, the standard directs attention to recovery and resilience mechanisms.

Step 1: Role of SP Element 8

SP Element 8 addresses backup, restore, and recovery capabilities. These activities ensure that systems can be restored quickly and reliably following failures, cyber incidents, or operational errors.

Step 2: Availability focus

Unexpected shutdowns often reveal weaknesses in backup integrity, restoration procedures, or recovery testing. ISA/IEC 62443 requires backups to be verified, protected, and periodically tested to ensure operational continuity.

Step 3: Why other SP Elements are secondary

Supply chain security, change control, and logging are important but do not directly restore operations after shutdowns. Backup and recovery directly impact downtime reduction.

Step 4: Operational outcome

Reviewing SP Element 8 activities helps identify gaps in restoration time objectives, backup completeness, and recovery procedures.

Thus, SP Element 8 – Backup restoration is the most relevant.

Maintenance service activities typically begin after the system is deployed and handed over to the asset owner. This is aligned with the Operation and Maintenance phase of the IACS lifecycle.

“Maintenance service providers typically become responsible for cybersecurity-related activities after the asset owner takes ownership of the system, following handover.”

— ISA/IEC 62443-2-4:2015, Clause 4.2.3 – Transition and Handover

Prior to handover, integrators and product suppliers manage the system. Maintenance providers take over only post-commissioning.

Multiuser accounts and shared passwords are accounts and passwords that are used by more than one person to access a system or a resource. They inherently carry the risk of unauthorized access, which means that someone who is not authorized or intended to use the account or password can gain access to the system or resource, and potentially compromise its confidentiality, integrity, or availability. For example, if a multiuser account and password are shared among several operators of an industrial automation and control system (IACS), an attacker who obtains the password can use the account to access the IACS and perform malicious actions, such as changing the system settings, deleting data, or disrupting the process. Multiuser accounts and shared passwords also make it difficult to track and audit the activities of individual users, and to enforce the principle of least privilege, which states that users should only have the minimum level of access required to perform their tasks. Therefore, the ISA/IEC 62443 standards recommend avoiding the use of multiuser accounts and shared passwords, and instead using individual accounts and strong passwords for each user, and implementing authentication and authorization mechanisms to control the access to the IACS. References:

ISA/IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 3-3: System security requirements and security levels1

ISA/IEC 62443-2-1:2009 - Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 2-1: Establishing an industrial automation and control systems security program2

ISA/IEC 62443 Cybersecurity Fundamentals Specialist Training Course3

Shared passwords and multiuser accounts pose specific risks, notably unauthorized access and privilege escalation. In ISA/IEC 62443's framework, these practices are discouraged because they complicate the attribution of actions to individual users and increase the likelihood that accounts can be used beyond their intended scope. Unauthorized access occurs when individuals exploit the shared nature of an account to gain entry to systems or data that they should not access. Privilege escalation can happen when users leverage shared accounts to perform actions at higher permission levels than those assigned to their personal accounts. Conversely, buffer overflows and race conditions are types of vulnerabilities or programming errors, not directly associated with the risks of multiuser accounts or shared passwords.

Authorization security policy is the primary factor that determines access privileges for user accounts. Authorization security policy is the function of specifying access rights or privileges to resources, which is related to general information security and computer security, and to access control in particular1. Authorization security policy defines who can access what resources, under what conditions, and for what purposes. Authorization security policy should be aligned with the business objectives and security requirements of the organization, and should be enforced by appropriate mechanisms and controls. Authorization security policy should also be reviewed and updated regularly to reflect changes in the environment, threats, and risks2. Authorization security policy is an essential part of the ISA/IEC 62443 standard, which provides a framework for securing industrial automation and control systems (IACS). The standard defines four security levels (SL) that represent the degree of protection against threats, and specifies the security capabilities that should be implemented for each SL. The standard also provides guidance on how to conduct a security risk assessment, how to define security zones and conduits, and how to apply security policies and procedures to the IACS environment34 . References: https://bing.com/search?q=authorization+security+policy

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/aspnet/core/security/authorization/policies?view=aspnetcore-7.0

One of the reasons for the increase in attacks on IACS is the availability of information and tools that can be used to exploit vulnerabilities in these systems. The Internet provides a platform for hackers, researchers, and activists to share their knowledge and techniques for compromising IACS. Some examples of such information and tools are:

Stuxnet: A sophisticated malware that targeted the Iranian nuclear program in 2010. It exploited four zero-day vulnerabilities in Windows and Siemens software to infect and manipulate the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that controlled the centrifuges. Stuxnet was widely analyzed and reported by the media and security experts, and its source code was leaked online1.

Metasploit: A popular penetration testing framework that contains modules for exploiting various IACS components and protocols. For instance, Metasploit includes modules for attacking Modbus, DNP3, OPC, and Siemens S7 devices2.

Shodan: A search engine that allows users to find devices connected to the Internet, such as webcams, routers, printers, and IACS components. Shodan can reveal the location, model, firmware, and configuration of these devices, which can be used by attackers to identify potential targets and vulnerabilities3.

ICS-CERT: A website that provides alerts, advisories, and reports on IACS security issues and incidents. ICS-CERT also publishes vulnerability notes and mitigation recommendations for various IACS products and vendors4. These sources of information and tools can be useful for legitimate purposes, such as security testing, research, and education, but they can also be misused by malicious actors who want to disrupt, damage, or steal from IACS. Therefore, IACS owners and operators should be aware of the threats and risks posed by the Internet and implement appropriate security measures to protect their systems. References:

The increase in attacks on Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) can be attributed to several factors, including: A. Use of proprietary communications protocols: These can pose security risks because they may not have been designed with security in mind and are often not as well-tested against security threats as more standard protocols. C. Knowledge of exploits and tools readily available on the Internet: The availability of information about vulnerabilities and exploits on the internet has made it easier for attackers to target IACS.

The other options, B and D, are incorrect because: B. The move towards commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems, protocols, and networks actually increases risk because these systems are more likely to be known and targeted by attackers, compared to proprietary systems which might benefit from security through obscurity. D. There is actually an increase in risk with more personnel with system knowledge because it enlarges the attack surface – each individual with system knowledge can potentially become a vector for an attack, either maliciously or accidentally.

Ransomware is a type of malicious software (malware) designed to block access to a computer system or data, typically by encrypting files, until a sum of money (ransom) is paid. This form of attack is increasingly targeting industrial automation and control system (IACS) environments due to the critical nature of these systems. Unlike phishing (which tricks users into revealing sensitive information) or DDoS attacks (which disrupt availability), ransomware specifically encrypts data and extorts the victim.

 According to the ISA/IEC 62443 Cybersecurity Fundamentals Specialist course, establishing policy, organization, and awareness is one of the four steps of the IACS cybersecurity lifecycle. This step involves defining the cybersecurity policies, roles, and responsibilities, as well as communicating them to the relevant stakeholders. It also involves establishing the risk tolerance level, which is the acceptable level of risk for the organization. Communicating policies and establishing the risk tolerance are both activities that are part of this step. Identifying detailed vulnerabilities and implementing countermeasures are activities that belong to the next steps of the lifecycle, which are assessing the current situation and implementing the cybersecurity program, respectively. References: ISA/IEC 62443 Cybersecurity Fundamentals Specialist course, Module 2: IACS Cybersecurity Lifecycle1

The OSI model defines 7 layers for standardizing communications in network systems. The Transport Layer is responsible for reliable data transfer between end systems, including flow control, error correction, and segmentation. It sits between the Network Layer and the Session Layer.

The correct OSI model from top to bottom is:

Application

Presentation

Session

Transport ← Missing layer

Network

Data Link

Physical

“The transport layer provides transparent transfer of data between end users, ensuring complete data transfer.”

— ISA/IEC 62443-3-3:2013, Annex A – Communications Stack and Layered Security Concepts

Understanding the OSI model is crucial when designing secure industrial networks, as ISA/IEC 62443 advocates for layered defense ("defense in depth") at all levels.

ISA/IEC 62443-1-3 is specifically titled "System Security Conformance Metrics" and introduces a methodology to develop quantitative metrics for assessing how well a system conforms to the ISA/IEC 62443 requirements.

“Part 1-3 defines a set of metrics to quantitatively measure the conformance of systems and components to the ISA/IEC 62443 series. It supports repeatable assessment and benchmarking.”

— ISA/IEC 62443-1-3:2013, Scope and Clause 5

This allows organizations to establish measurable KPIs and drive continuous improvement in IACS cybersecurity programs.