AZ-800 Microsoft Administering Windows Server Hybrid Core Infrastructure Free Practice Exam Questions (2026 Updated)

The AZ-800 content covering Active Directory Sites and Services clarifies that site, subnet, and site-link objects live in the Configuration partition. The guides emphasize that administration of the Configuration naming context is restricted to Enterprise Admins and to Domain Admins of the forest-root domain. In the context of changing replication topology parameters—such as editing the replication schedule on site links—the documentation notes: “Only Enterprise Admins or administrators in the forest-root Domain Admins group have default permissions to modify site and site-link objects,” because these objects affect replication forest-wide.

Applying this to the scenario:

Contoso\Admin1 (Enterprise Admins) has forest-wide rights to modify site links.

Contoso\Admin2 (Domain Admins in contoso.com, the forest-root domain) also has the required rights to change site-link schedules.

Canada\Admin3 (Domain Admins in canada.contoso.com) does not have default permissions in the Configuration partition for forest-wide site-link administration.

Thus, to meet the technical requirement to change all site links to a 30-minute schedule, the users who can perform the task are Admin1 and Admin2.

In the Windows Server exam materials for Administering Windows Server Hybrid Core Infrastructure (AZ-800) , Microsoft documents that Data Deduplication is supported only on data volumes and specifically on NTFS-formatted volumes , and it cannot be enabled on the system or boot volume . The study text states: “Data Deduplication is applied at the volume level and supports NTFS data volumes. You cannot enable deduplication on the system or boot volume.” It further clarifies unsupported targets: “ReFS volumes and FAT/exFAT volumes are not supported for Data Deduplication in general-purpose server scenarios,” and emphasizes that deduplication is “not available for the operating s ystem volume.”

Applying these rules to VM3:

C: NTFS but it is the OS/system volume → not eligible .

D: NTFS data volume → eligible .

E: ReFS → not supported for general-purpose dedup in this context.

F: exFAT → not supported .

Therefore, the only volume on which you can enable Data Deduplication to meet the requirement is volume D .

In the AZ-800 “Administering Windows Server Hybrid Core Infrastructure” objectives for Active Directory, server promotion is governed by forest/domain administrative roles. The materials state that promoting a member server to a domain controller in a given domain requires membership in either the Enterprise Admins group or the Domain Admins group of the target domain. The Configuration and Domain naming contexts that DCPromo touches (NTDS settings, SYSVOL/DFS-R readiness, DC computer account, and associated service SPNs) are protected so that “Enterprise Admins have full rights forest-wide, and Domain Admins have full rights within their respective domain.”

In this case, the requirement is to promote Server1 to a domain controller in canada.contoso.com. From the identities table:

Contoso\Admin1 is a member of Enterprise Admins (forest-wide authority).

Canada\Admin3 is a member of Canada\Domain Admins (authority within canada.contoso.com).

Contoso\Admin2 is Domain Admins (contoso.com) only, which does not grant administrative authority in the canada.contoso.com child domain.

Therefore, the users who can currently perform the required task for Server1 are Admin1 and Admin3.

n the Administering Windows Server Hybrid Core Infrastructure guidance for managing AD DS, Microsoft emphasizes using OU-level delegation to satisfy administrative needs while adhering to the principle of least privilege. The documentation explains that the Delegate Control wizard on an OU lets you grant a user or group only the specific permissions required for common tasks, including “Modify the membership of a group”. This grants the write permission to the member attribute on group objects contained in that OU, without giving broader account-management rights across the domain.

By contrast, placing a user in Account Operators or Server Operators provides elevated, domain-wide capabilities far beyond what is required. Account Operators can create, delete, and modify many account types across the domain (except for protected admin accounts), which violates least-privilege for a task that only needs to change group membership in one OU. Server Operators is unrelated to group membership and is intended for server administration tasks. Creating a delegation at the domain root would similarly be excessive because it applies broadly to all containers and OUs.

Therefore, to meet the requirement “Ensure that User1 can manage the membership of all the groups in Contoso\OU3,” you should delegate control on OU3 and assign the built-in task “Modify the membership of a group” to User1, achieving the minimal permissions necessary.

In the Windows Server Hybrid Core Infrastructure objectives for Active Directory group design, group scope and type determine valid membership and usage. The study guidance for group scopes states that a Domain Local group is used to assign permissions in its own domain and “can contain accounts, computer objects, global groups from any domain, and universal groups; it can also contain other domain local groups from the same domain only.” Security-type restrictions also apply: “Security groups can contain only security principals; distribution groups cannot be nested into security groups for access control.”

Applying these rules to Group3 (contoso.com Domain Local Security): it can accept security groups of compatible scopes. From the lists, Group1 (contoso.com Universal Security) and Group2 (contoso.com Global Security) are valid. Distribution groups (Group4, Group5, Group6) are not valid members of a security group used for authorization. Therefore, Group3 ⇒ Group1 and Group2 only.

For Group5 (canada.contoso.com Global Distribution), the scope rule for Global groups is: “Global groups can include user accounts and other global groups from the same domain only; they cannot include universal or domain local groups.” Hence, the only eligible group from the same domain and scope is Group4 (canada.contoso.com Global Distribution). Group6 is domain local (invalid), and cross-domain globals (Group2) are not permitted. Therefore, Group5 ⇒ Group4 only.

Server1 - Set-Item

Server4 - Enable-PSRemoting

In the Administering Windows Server Hybrid Core Infrastructure materials under Hyper-V management, Microsoft specifies that Enhanced Sess ion Mode changes VMConnect from a raw console attach to a connection that uses Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to the guest. The guide states that Enhanced Session Mode “ uses RDP to establish the VMConnect session so the user must supply credentials for a lo gon to the guest operating system ,” and further that it “ prevents a second administrator from inheriting an already signed-in console session ” because the connection is treated as a new interactive sign-in. In contrast, the default basic console session “ attaches directly to the active console without prompting for credentials ,” which is exactly the current problem described for VM2.

The same objective area clarifies that other options do not meet the requirement: Guest Services integration only enables fi le copy and certain host-guest interactions; Credential Guard protects secrets inside Windows by isolating LSASS but does not affect Hyper-V console connection behavior ; Shielded VMs provide fabric-level protections and encryption but are not required mere ly to force credential prompts for VMConnect.

Therefore, to force users to provide credentials when they connect to VM2 and to eliminate inherited console sessions, you should enable Enhanced Session Mode on the Hyper-V host (and ensure the guest supports RDP).

Modify the trust on : DC2

Modify the permissions for the : Computer object of SRV1

In an Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) environment involving multiple forests and external trusts, managing granular access across domain boundaries is achieved through Selective Authentication . According to official documents for Administering Windows Server Hybrid Core Infrastructure, there are two primary authentication settings for a trust: Domain-wide authentication and Se lective authentication .

When you need to restrict users from a trusted forest (contoso.com) so they can only access specific resources in the trusting forest (adatum.com), you must configure the trust to use Selective Authentication . This configuration must be performed in the resource domain (the trusting domain). Based on the provided table, DC2 is the domain controller for adatum.com , which is where the shared resources (SRV1) reside. Therefore, you must modify the trust properties on DC2 to enable Selective Authentication for the incoming trust from contoso.com.

Once Selective Authentication is enabled, Windows does not automatically grant the " Authenticated Users " SID to the user ' s access token for resources in the local domain. Instead, administrators must explicitly grant the Allowed to Authenticate permission on the specific resource ' s computer object. In this scenario, since the requirement is to restrict access specifically to resources on SRV1 , you must modify the security permissions on the Comput er object of SRV1 in Active Directory Users and Computers. By granting the contoso.com users (or a group containing them) this permission, they can successfully authenticate against SRV1 while being blocked from all other servers in the adatum.com forest. This satisfies the requirement to prevent access to any other resources while maintaining the ability of adatum.com users to access contoso.com (as the 2-way trust remains intact).

To create a group-managed service account (gMSA) named gMSA1 and make it available on SRV1, you can follo w these steps:

Step 1: Create the Key Distribution Services Root Key First, you need to create the KDS Root Key, which is required for the gMSA to function. You can do this with the following PowerShell command:

Add-KdsRootKey –EffectiveTime ((get-date).ad dhours(-10))

Note: The -EffectiveTime parameter is set to 10 hours in the past to ensure immediate effect.

Step 2: Create the gMSA Next, use the New-ADServiceAccount cmdlet to create the gMSA:

New-ADServiceAccount -Name gMSA1 -DNSHostName gmsa1.domain.com -PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword SRV1$

Replace domain.com with your actual domain name.

Step 3: Install the gMSA on SRV1 Now, you need to install the gMSA on the server SRV1. Run the following command on SRV1:

Install-ADServiceAccount -Identity gMSA1

Step 4: Test the gMSA To ensure that the gMSA is installed correctly and ready for use, perform a test using:

Test-ADServiceAccount -Identity gMSA1

If the test returns True, the gMSA is correctly installed and ready for use on SRV1.

Step 5: Configure the Service to Use the gMSA Finally, configure the service that requires the gMSA to use gMSA1 by setting the service’s logon account to domain\gMSA1$ and leave the password field blank.

This will create and make the gMSA gMSA1 available on SRV1. Ensure t hat you have the necessary permissions and that SRV1 is properly joined to the domain before proceeding with these steps123.

Objective:

Grant permissions to the BranchAdmins group to manage the fabikam.com DNS zone on DC1.

Step-by-Step Guide

✅ Step 1: Log in to the DNS Server

Log in to DC1 (which hosts the DNS zone fabikam.com) using an account with Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin rights.

✅ Step 2: Open the DNS Manager

Open DNS Manager:

Press Windows + R, type dnsmgmt.msc, and hit Ent er.

✅ Step 3: Locate the Zone

In the DNS Manager, expand the Forward Lookup Zones.

Locate and right-click on the zone fabikam.com.

✅ Step 4: Open Zone Properties

Right-click on fabikam.com and select Properties.

In the Properties window, go to the Secu rity tab.

✅ Step 5: Grant Permissions

In the Security tab, click Add.

Enter the name of the group:

nginx

Copy

BranchAdmins

Click Check Names to resolve the group.

Click OK.

✅ Step 6: Assign the Appropriate Permissions

In the Permissions window, select the BranchAdmins group.

Assign the following permissions:

Read

Write

Create All Child Objects

Delete All Child Objects

Optionally, click Advanced for more granular control if needed.

✅ Step 7: Apply and Close

Click Apply and OK to save the changes.

One possible solution to prevent domain users from saving executable files in a share named \SRVl\Data is to use file screening on the file server. File screening allows you to block certain files from being saved based on their file name extension. Here are the steps to configure file screening:

On the file server, open File Server Resource Manager from the Administrative Tools menu.

In the left pane, expand File Screening Management and click on File Groups.

Righ t-click on File Groups and select Create File Group.

In the File Group Properties dialog box, enter a name for the file group, such as Executable Files.

In the Files to include box, enter the file name extensions that you want to block, such as .exe, .bat, .cmd, .com, .msi, .scr. You can use wildcards to specify multiple extensions, such as *.exe.

Click OK to create the file group.

In the left pane, click on File Screen Templates.

Right-click on File Screen Templates and select Create File Screen Template.

In the File Screen Template Properties dialog box, enter a name for the template, such as Block Executable Files.

On the Settings tab, select the option Active screening: Do not allow users to save unauthorized files.

On the File Groups tab, check the box next to the file group that you created, such as Executable Files.

On the Notification tab, you can configure how to notify users and administrators when a file screening event occurs, such as sending an email, logging an event, or running a command or scr ipt. You can also customize the message that users see when they try to save a blocked file.

Click OK to create the file screen template.

In the left pane, click on File Screens.

Right-click on File Screens and select Create File Screen.

In the Create File Screen dialog box, enter the path of the folder that you want to apply the file screening to, such as \SRVl\Data.

Select the option Derive properties from this file screen template (recommended) and choose the template that you created, such as Block Exec utable Files.

Click Create to create the file screen.

Now, domain users will not be able to save executable files in the share named \SRVl\Data. They will be able to save other files to the share.