300-215 Cisco Conducting Forensic Analysis and Incident Response Using Cisco CyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) Free Practice Exam Questions (2026 Updated)

During the initial phase of incident response, the two key actions are:

Disconnecting the server (B) to contain the threat and prevent lateral movement or further exfiltration.

Reviewing network logs (E) to understand the timeline and scope of the attack.

These are emphasized in the containment and detection stages of the incident response lifecycle outlined in NIST 800-61 and covered in the Cisco CyberOps training.

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The STIX data structure shows a pattern field with this entry:

file:hashes.'SHA-256' = '3299f07bc0711b3587fe8a1c6bf3ee6cbcc14cb775f64b28a61d72ebcb8968d3'

This value is a SHA-256 file hash, a well-known indicator of compromise (IoC) for identifying malicious files.

Therefore, the correct answer is:

A. SHA256 file hash.

The root cause analysis report’s main goal is to identify what allowed the ransomware to successfully infect systems. The Cisco CyberOps Associate guide emphasizes the importance of uncovering and mitigating the actual vulnerabilities that were exploited during an incident. These could include outdated software, unpatched systems, or poor access control. While understanding the encryption technique or C2 server is helpful for threat intelligence, it does not address the root cause.

The guide states:

"Effective IR helps professionals to leverage the information collected from a security incident to better understand the intrusion and its functionality… this data helps the security team to be better prepared and equipped to handle future incidents".

Identifying the exploited vulnerabilities enables future prevention strategies such as patch management, configuration hardening, and reducing attack surfaces.

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The described scenario includes both internal alerts (unusual network traffic, failed logins, suspicious file access) and external intelligence indicating active ransomware campaigns in the same industry. This constitutes a strong combination of precursors and indicators, as defined in the NIST SP 800-61 incident handling model and reinforced in the Cisco CyberOps Associate curriculum.

According to the Cisco guide:

“Once an incident has occurred, the IR team needs to contain it quickly before it affects other systems and networks within the organization.”

“The containment phase is crucial in stopping the threat from spreading and compromising more systems”.

Given these indicators and the high-value nature of the data involved, it is essential to proactively isolate suspected systems and activate the incident response plan to prevent damage from potential ransomware.

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The event log shown in the exhibit is Event ID 104, which in Windows indicates "The audit log was cleared." This is a significant indicator of log tampering, a common post-exploitation technique used by attackers to hide their tracks after exfiltrating data or performing unauthorized actions.

The Cisco CyberOps Associate guide mentions:

"Log deletion events, especially Event ID 104, should be treated as potential evidence of malicious activity attempting to cover tracks".

Combined with large data dumps to network shares, this indicates not only unauthorized activity but also deliberate efforts to erase forensic evidence—characteristic of log tampering.

Fileless malware resides in memory and does not leave traditional file artifacts, making it difficult for antivirus solutions to detect. The most effective next step is to isolate the endpoints to prevent lateral movement and perform memory forensics to capture volatile data and identify any running malicious processes.

The most relevant log for system-level events such as memory exhaustion and shutdown is /var/log/messages.log, which contains kernel and service-level logs including OOM (Out-Of-Memory) events.

As detailed in Linux investigations:

"Logs located in /var/log/messages provide critical system error reporting including shutdowns, memory errors, and service failures".

The key goal during lateral movement analysis is to determine whether the malware spread or attempted to spread beyond the initially compromised system. This is crucial for containment and scoping of the incident. Logs, sandbox behavior, or network activity may show if Patient 0 initiated outbound connections to other systems, potentially propagating malware across the environment.

Correct answer: D. if Patient 0 tried to connect to another workstation.

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) offers features like:

File trajectory: to track file behavior and spread across endpoints.

Orbital Advanced Search: for querying endpoint data to detect threats in real time.

The incident stems from a policy-level issue rather than a technical vulnerability. According to incident response best practices, the priority should be to review and update firewall rules and ensure that the network security policy aligns with the principle of least privilege and correct access segmentation.

When analyzing suspicious files in a sandbox environment, a security analyst focuses on identifying and evaluating their behavior in a controlled setting to confirm potential malicious activity:

Inspect processes (B): Observing the processes that the file spawns or injects into during execution helps identify malicious actions or privilege escalation. This is a crucial part of dynamic analysis in the sandbox environment.

Inspect PE header (E): The PE (Portable Executable) header contains metadata about how the file will execute on Windows systems. It reveals details such as the entry point, libraries used, and whether the file is suspiciously crafted or packed, which can be strong indicators of malicious behavior.

The other options (A, C, D) are important in the broader forensic analysis, but within the sandbox dynamic analysis, focusing on process behavior and file execution headers is critical for determining how the file interacts with the system and whether it is indeed malicious.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation:

The log entry contains the following key elements:

The timestamp: (04/Jan/2022:20:18:06 +0000)

HTTP method and URI: "GET /%60%60%60%60%60%60/ HTTP/2.0"

HTTP status code: 404

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 ... Firefox/95.0

The status code 404 indicates that the requested resource was not found on the server. This is a standard HTTP response that signifies the server could not locate the requested URI (in this case, likely due to a malformed or invalid path /\`````/, where %60 is the URL-encoded form of the backtick character "").

There is no clear evidence of SQL injection, WAF detection, or redirection in this log. The use of encoded backticks may suggest probing behavior, but the log does not show a definitive attack signature.

Therefore, the correct interpretation is:

Answer: D. The requested page was not found.

The Wireshark output shows SMB protocol transactions, including NT Create AndX Response and Write AndX Response, indicating the transfer of files or objects. SMB (Server Message Block) is a protocol used for file sharing and printer access in Windows networks. The log does not indicate phishing or redirection behavior but rather normal SMB communication such as accessing files or shared resources.

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The log entry shows a failed SSH login attempt for an invalid user “admin” from IP 192.168.1.100. As the system has just gone live and no legitimate use is expected, this could be an early reconnaissance or brute-force attempt. However, blocking IPs or resetting passwords without fully understanding the context could lead to incomplete remediation or false positives.

According to Cisco CyberOps best practices, the first step is to thoroughly investigate the alert by correlating it with other logs (e.g., authentication logs, IDS/IPS logs) to determine the intent and scope of activity.

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When dealing with suspected malicious activity involving obfuscated PowerShell scripts—especially when launched from Microsoft Word documents—behavioral analysis is the most critical next step. This approach helps in determining if the process chain is part of a known attack pattern, such as a phishing attempt using malicious macros that launch PowerShell for data exfiltration or payload download.

As highlighted in the CyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) 300-215 study guide, understanding behavior and deobfuscating PowerShell scripts is an essential part of the forensic and incident response process. Specifically:

During the detection and analysis phase, if PowerShell is used with obfuscated or encoded commands, responders should investigate the intent and behavior of the command.

Deobfuscation allows analysts to see what the script is doing (e.g., downloading files, creating persistence mechanisms, or opening a reverse shell).

The guide states:

“For example, if the threat is malware, the compromised system should be immediately isolated and the malware should be placed in a sandbox or a detonation chamber to understand what it is trying to do”.

This confirms that understanding execution behavior (such as what the PowerShell script intends to perform) is key to uncovering indicators of compromise (IoCs).

Thus, option C—conducting a behavioral analysis and deobfuscating PowerShell—is the most critical and effective response at this stage.

In VMware ESXi systems, the vmksummary.log file is responsible for capturing general system events, including uptime, reboot statistics, and key service-related issues. It serves as a valuable source for troubleshooting persistent or unexplained system behaviors.

The Cisco CyberOps study guide references log file paths used in system diagnostics and incident response, and for authentication-related issues on ESXi where standard logs don't yield insights, vmksummary.log is the recommended next source for identifying systemic service faults or anomalies.

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