Salesforce Plat-Arch-205 Practice Test Questions Answers

The requirement is an authorization requirement, not merely a page-design preference. Removing the Work Order Edit object permission from the Sales Representative permission model prevents those users from updating Work Orders regardless of which UI, API, automation entry point, or page layout they use. Page layouts can make fields appear read-only, but they are presentation controls and should not be relied on as the security boundary. A sharing rule is also the wrong tool because sharing rules add record-level access; they do not reduce the CRUD capabilities a user already has. In a modern Salesforce permission architecture, the organization should remove Edit from the relevant profile or baseline permission set and verify that no other assigned permission set or permission set group grants it back, because permissions are additive. The page can still be configured to present an appropriate read-only experience, but enforcement belongs at the object-permission layer. Study Guide reference: Permissions to Standard Objects, Custom Objects, and Fields - object CRUD, profiles, permission sets, page-layout limitations, and least-privilege authorization.

Custom Apex that serves a Lightning component must not assume that the client-side component has already enforced the user ' s data access. Apex can execute in system context, so the development team must explicitly preserve record visibility and enforce the user ' s CRUD and Field-Level Security where appropriate. The record-level requirement can be handled with the correct sharing declaration or user-mode operations, while object and field authorization can be enforced through user mode, Security.stripInaccessible(), or valid Schema Describe checks. Creating runAs tests is valuable for verification but does not secure production execution. Likewise, method names such as isShareable are not valid substitutes for the platform ' s real security APIs. The architectural principle is to treat the LWC-to-Apex boundary as a server-side trust boundary: every Apex entry point should return only records and fields that the running user is entitled to access. Study Guide reference: Permissions to Standard Objects, Custom Objects, and Fields - system-mode Apex, record-sharing enforcement, CRUD/FLS, user-mode operations, and Lightning/Apex security boundaries.

View All Users is the narrowly scoped system permission intended for users who must see every User record regardless of the User object ' s sharing restrictions. That makes it appropriate for an identity and access audit because the team can review user configuration without receiving broad visibility to unrelated business data. View All Data is far more powerful: it bypasses record-level restrictions across the organization and would violate least privilege when the requirement is limited to User setup. The User object also has specialized visibility and sharing semantics, so simply thinking in terms of a generic object-level Read permission does not address the need to bypass restrictive User sharing. The preferred architecture is to grant View All Users through a dedicated permission set assigned only to the identity and access auditors, then remove it when no longer required. Study Guide reference: Access to Other Data - User record sharing, View All Users, identity administration, system permissions, and least privilege.

Read/Write Opportunity Team access allows the team member to edit the Opportunity record, assuming the user also has the necessary object- and field-level permissions. Updating a normal Opportunity field such as Stage therefore falls within the access granted by the team membership. Ownership transfer is a separate privilege and is not automatically granted merely because a user can edit the record. Likewise, being a member of the Opportunity Team does not necessarily give the user authority to add or remove other team members; team administration is controlled by ownership and applicable administrative permissions. This distinction reflects Salesforce ' s layered security model: Opportunity Team membership supplies record access, while object permissions and ownership-related privileges govern what operations the user can perform. The owner always has the broadest control over the Opportunity and can manage collaboration more extensively than an ordinary team member. Study Guide reference: Access to Records - Opportunity Teams, Read/Write access, ownership, team administration, and collaborative sales security.

Partner Community is the appropriate external license model because the distributors participate in a B2B sales process and require Opportunity visibility. Partner-oriented licenses support the external role hierarchy and the sales-object collaboration model needed for channel users such as distributors and resellers. Customer Community is primarily aimed at high-volume customer self-service and does not provide the same Opportunity-oriented partner model. Customer Community Plus adds more advanced sharing than basic Customer Community, but it is not the primary licensing model for external channel sales collaboration. At the scale described, the architect must also design the partner role hierarchy and external sharing model carefully so that one distributor cannot see another distributor ' s records and so that role/group proliferation does not create unnecessary sharing complexity. The license defines the ceiling of what the external user can do; UC must still configure object permissions and record-level sharing to expose only the Opportunities relevant to each distributor. Study Guide reference: Access to Records - Experience Cloud licensing, Partner Community, Opportunity access, partner roles, external sales collaboration, and scalable partner sharing.